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3Abstract
This essay consists of three chapters.
Chapter one extends Allen and Gale’s (2000) model to a
core-periphery network structure. We identify that the financial
contagion in core-periphery structure is different to Allen and Gale
(2000) in two aspects. Firstly, the shocks to the periphery bank and
to the core bank have different contagion processes. Secondly,
contagion not only depends on the amount of claims a bank has on a
failed bank, but also on the number of links the failed neighbour has.
Chapter two studies the policy effect on financial network
formation when the government has time-inconsistency problem on
bailing out systemically important bank. We show that if interbank
deposits are guaranteed, the equilibrium network structure is
different from the one under market discipline. We show that under
market discipline individual banks can collectively increase the
component size using interbank intermediation in order to increases
the severity of systemic risk and hence trigger the bailout. If
interbank intermediation is costly the equilibrium network has
core-periphery structure.
Chapter three follows Acharya and Yorulmazer’s (2007) study of
the “too many to fail” problem in a two-bank model. They argue that
in order to reduce the social losses, the financial regulator finds it ex
post optimal to bail out every troubled bank if they fail together,
because the acquisition of liquidated assets by other investors result
in a high misallocation cost. In contrast to their paper, we argue that
there is no “too many to fail” bailout, unless banking capital is costly
and market price sensitive. We argue that market price sensitive
capital can induce banks herding and high social cost.
4Introduction
Early banking theories, such as those of Diamond (1984) and Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), mostly result from representative agent model. They show that, on the one
hand, banks play an important role in completing the market and providing special
expertise in monitoring the loans, on the other hand, banks tend to have risk-shifting
incentive, as in principle-agent models. This type of banking theory gives strong
support for regulating individual banks, so-called micro-prudential financial policies,
such as Basel 1 and 2, which argue that the prudent behaviour and risk management
practices of each individual bank ensures the stability and soundness of the financial
system as a whole (Kashyap, Rojan and Stein 2008). In other words, the financial
system works fine as long as each individual bank is well behaved.
However, this type of financial policies fails to internalize individual banks’
strategic interactions, In particular, the strategic herding behaviour and network
interactions which could lead to systemic failure of financial system1. A prominent
example regarding to the ineffectiveness of individual regulatory policy is the turmoil
of recent sub-prime mortgage crisis. There are two distinct features in the crisis. First,
banks’ balance sheets exhibit high similarity before the crisis; many banks possess
Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS). Second, the crisis is highly contagious stem from
interbank connection (see Brunnermeier (2008) and Hellwig (2009)). As a result, the
governments have to bail out the troubled banks.
In this essay we examine the effect of financial policy on individual banks’
interaction and the resulting systemic risk. The essay focuses on two issues. Firstly we
1 In this essay we impose two definitions on systemic failure. In Chapter 1 and 2, systemic risk refers
to the propagation of an agent’s economic distress to other agents linked to that agent through interbank
connections. To the extent that interbank lendings are neither collateralised nor insured against, a
bank’s failure may trigger a chain of subsequent failures and therefore force the central bank to
intervene to bail out the troubled banks, see Craig and Peter (2010). In Chapter 3 we define systemic
failure as the state where all banks fail simultaneously. See De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) for detailed
discussion on defining systemic failures.
5show how network theory can contribute to the analysis of systemic risk. Secondly we
examine how financial policy affects banks’ strategic interaction.
The general concept of a network is quite intuitive: a network describes a collection
of nodes and the links connecting them. In the context of financial systems, the nodes
can represent individual banks, while the links are created through, for example, credit
exposures between banks. As Haldane (2009) stresses, a network approach to
financial system is particularly important for evaluating contagious failure such that
the failure of a single institution may create for the financial system as a whole, and
can be instrumental in examining individual banks’ interaction, in particular network
externalities. A better understanding of network externalities could thus be helpful for
the reform of the current financial policy.
The current financial policy, as we have discussed above, focuses heavily on
regulating individual banks. We argue that this type of policy may be inefficient in a
decentralized banking system, if the government suffers from time-inconsistency
problems of bailout. In particular we show that market price sensitive capital
regulation and market discipline may induce banks to coordinate to high probability
of systemic failure. This argument is similar to Torre and Ize (2009) who suggest that
a successful financial policy needs to integrate the paradigms of agency
(principle-agent problems) and externalities (contagious problems). If financial policy
tries to address the central problem under agent paradigm, it may made the problems
under the externalities paradigms worse.
The essay consists of three chapters. Chapter one extends Allen and Gale’s (2000)
model of financial contagion in regular network to a core-periphery network structure.
Empirical evidence shows that the financial network structure is heterogeneous, with
a few nodes having many links and many nodes having a few links- so called
6core-periphery structure. We identify that the contagion process under this structure is
different from Allen and Gale (2000). Firstly, in Allen and Gale (2000) a shock to any
one of the banks has the same contagious effect on the others, whereas we show that
shocks to the peripheral bank and to the core bank have different contagion processes.
A shock to the core bank affects many other banks in the economy, whereas a shock
to a peripheral bank is less powerful; this is similar to the robustness of network
resilience to a disturbance resulted from statistical physics in the complex network
literature. Secondly, in contrast to Allen and Gale (2000), who argue that once the
neighbour of a failed bank becomes bankrupt it has to be true that all the banks in the
component fail, our finding suggests that this is not necessarily the case, because
contagion not only depends on the amount of claims a bank has on a failed bank, but
also on the number of links this failed neighbour has; the more neighbours it has, the
greater liquidation value it has and the less likely that its neighbour(s) fail. We
conclude that regular networks and core–periphery networks react differently to
idiosyncratic shock.
Chapter two examines the policy effect on financial network formation when
government has time-inconsistency problem of bailing out systemically important
banks. We show that if interbank deposits are guarantee, the equilibrium network
structure is different to the one under market discipline. Under market discipline
individual banks can collectively increase the component size by using interbank
intermediation in order to increases the severity of systemic risk and hence trigger the
government bailout. If intermediation is costly we show that the equilibrium network
has core-periphery structure. The chapter suggests that if financial regulation is based
on representative agent model or treats the network structure as given, they may
7ignore the effect of a new regulation on banks’ interaction. A new equilibrium
network could emerge which lead to this regulatory policy ineffective.
Chapter three argues that market price sensitive capital regulation combined with
the government’s bailout policy can induce banks to herd by investing in highly
correlated assets. The chapter follows Acharya and Yorulmazer’s (2007) study of the
“too many to fail” problem in a two-bank model. They argue that in order to reduce
social losses due to the systemic risk of banks failing together, the financial regulator
finds it ex post optimal to bail out every troubled bank, because the acquisition of
liquidated assets by other investors result in a high misallocation cost. In contrast to
their paper, we argue that as long as it is profitable for banks to purchase the
liquidated assets at the cash-in-the-market price, in the state of systemic failure, the
regulator can always commit to randomly bailing out only one bank and letting the
bailed out bank purchase the failed bank’s assets– there is no “too many to fail”
bailout. We then show that market price sensitive capital regulation can remove banks’
incentive to purchase liquidated assets at the cash-in-the-market price, given the high
cost of banking capital. Thus, in the state of systemic failure, the regulator has to bail
out every troubled bank. A “too many to fail” rescue arises. We then argue that
market price sensitive capital can increase systemic failure.
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9Chapter 1
Financial Contagion in a Core–Periphery Network
Summary
Empirical evidence shows that the financial network is asymmetric, with a few nodes
having many links and many nodes having a few links- so called core-periphery
structure. We identify that the contagion process under this structure is different from
Allen and Gale (2000). Firstly, in Allen and Gale (2000) a shock to any one of the
banks has the same contagious effect on the others, whereas we show that shocks to
the peripheral bank and to the core bank have different contagion processes. A shock
to a core bank affects many other banks in the economy, whereas a shock to a
peripheral bank is less powerful; this is similar to the robustness of network resilience
to a disturbance resulted from statistical physics in the complex network literature.
Secondly, in contrast to Allen and Gale (2000), which shows that once the neighbour
of a failed bank becomes bankrupt it has to be true that all the banks in the connected
network fail, our finding suggests that this is not necessarily the case, because
contagion not only depends on the amount of claims a bank has on a failed bank, but
also on the number of links this failed neighbour has; the more neighbours it has, the
greater liquidation value it receives and the less likely that its neighbour fails. Thus,
regular networks and core–periphery networks react differently to shocks.
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1. Introduction
The existence of interbank market formed by financial institutions plays a key role in
financial stability. On the one hand, argued by Cocco et al. (2004), it plays a crucial
role in monitoring banks, conducting monetary policy and most importantly the
provision of liquidity for a troubled bank facing a liquidity shock. On the other hand,
the interbank market can transmit shocks from one bank to another which triggers the
problem of contagious failure, thereby increasing the likelihood of systemic risk.
Since one of the targets for the central banks is to ensure financial stability, this
spillover effect implies that the central banks needs to avoid the systemic risk that
would otherwise undermine the system as a whole, and make the system stronger by
reducing such risk. In this vein, it is important for central banks to understand how
shocks propagate across the financial system.
In order to do so, one can use network topology to model the financial system. In
general, a network is any system that can have mathematical representation as a graph
in which the nodes identify the elements of the system and the set of connecting links
represents the relation or interaction among those elements. In this regard, the
financial system is a very good candidate for a network in which the nodes are
financial institutions and the links represent the interaction among them, such as credit
exposures between banks due to liquidity risk sharing.
Remarkably, many empirical evidences found that financial networks in many
developed countries share a common feature – they exhibit statistically heterogeneous
connectivity (see Boss et al. (2004), Degryse and Nguyen (2004), Upper and Worms
(2004), and Becher et al. (2008)). The high level of heterogeneity of many networks is
simply provided by the fact that many nodes have just a few connections, while a few
hubs collect hundreds or even thousands of edges– a core–periphery structure. The
presence of hubs and connectivity ordering in many cases yields a degree distribution
with heavy tails2. Figure 1 gives the illustration of a core-periphery financial network
structure in Austria.
However, despite the vigorous
networks, there is little attention foc
financial stability in the theory of e
to model financial contagion in a ne
in these studies is that of Allen an
overlapping claims, which are held b
Allen and Gale (2000) assume th
the economy, but the number of e
2 Most real-world networks have skewed
broad range. This behaviour is very diffe
distributions and in several cases the heav
results in linear behaviour on the double lo
nodes with degrees much larger than the a
words, the average behaviour of the system
present and the average degree does not rep
Network structure of the Austrian iFigure 1
nterbank market. See Boss et al. (2004) figure 111
empirical evidence on the structure of financial
using on the effect of core-periphery structure on
conomics, and there are just a few papers that try
twork context. Perhaps the most influential paper
d Gale (2000). They focus on contagion through
y ex ante identical banks on one another.
at the aggregate demand for liquidity is known in
arly consumers is random in each bank with the
degree distribution in the sense that the degrees vary over a
rent from the case of bell-shaped, exponentially decaying
y tail can be approximated by a power law decay, which
garithmic scale. In the theory of complexity, this implies that
verage are found with a non-negligible probability. In other
is not typical, which means all the intermediate values are
resent any special value for the distribution.
same variance. Since the banks are otherwise identical, banks with liquidity surpluses
have an incentive to provide liquidity for banks with liquidity shortages through the
exchange of interbank deposits. Thus, this interbank relationship works well as long
as there is no shock to the aggregate liquidity demand. They mainly consider two
cases in which all the banks have the same number of neighbours and each link has
the same amount of overlapping deposits. First, the deposits of each bank are evenly
distributed to every bank (see figure 2.a): a so-called completely connected network.
Second, each bank only has a deposit in its negative correlated bank: an incomplete
network (see figure 2.b).
The first-best allocation can be achieved i
probability zero liquidity shock at the begi
structures give different threshold values of a
the aggregate liquidity supply in period 1 is fi
linked through overlapping claims, if one
neighbour of this region suffers a loss beca
bank falls. It is intuitive that the fewer claim
less spillover effect it suffers from the trouble
that, at a given value of a probability zero
contagion in a complete market than in an inc
A B
D C
a
Figure 2
Bank A and C are negatively co12
n both cases. However, when there is a
nning of the first period, two different
n outbreak of financial contagion. Since
xed by period 0 allocation and banks are
of the regions faces bankruptcy, the
use the value of claims on the troubled
s one bank has on the troubled bank, the
d bank. Allen and Gale (2000) conclude
liquidity shock, it is less likely to have
omplete market.
A B
D C
rrelated with B and D
b
13
Inspired by the study of Allen and Gale (2000), we extend their model to a
core–periphery network by imposing heterogeneous volatility of liquidity shocks
among banks. This heterogeneity produces some interesting results. Firstly, unlike
Allen and Gale’s study in which a shock to any one of the banks has the same effect
on the others, we show that a shock to a peripheral bank has a different contagion
process from a shock to a core bank. This finding is similar to the robustness of
network resilience to a disturbance result from statistic physics in a complex network;
the comparison between Allen and Gale’s model and our model is backed by evidence
put forward by Albert et al. (2000), who argue that heterogeneous and homogeneous
topologies react very differently to damage. Secondly, in contrast to Allen and Gale
(2000), who argue that once the neighbour of a failed bank becomes bankrupt it has to
be true that all the banks in the economy fail, our finding suggests that this is not
necessarily the case, because contagion not only depends on the amount of claims a
bank has on a failed bank, but also on the number of links this failed neighbour has;
the more neighbours it has, the greater liquidation value it will have and the less likely
that its neighbour will fail. The chapter thus implies that the core banks play an
important role in financial network stability. The argument is very similar to that of
Gai and Kapadia (2010) where they show that- with a stochastically generated
complex network- the financial system exhibits a “robust-yet-fragile” property. This
feature indicates that core banks, which have greater connectivity, can reduce the
likelihood of financial contagion; but they can have highly significant impact on the
system if they fail. Their argument is consistent with our proposition in section 4, as
we will see later. Note however that this chapter examines a fixed core-periphery
network, unlike the stochastically generated networks of Gail and Kapadia (2010).
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The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and
empirical literature on financial networks. Section 3 presents the model. We show that
the decentralized economy with heterogeneous regional liquidity volatility can reach
first-best solution as in Allen and Gale (2000). Section 4 examines financial contagion
under core-periphery structure. Section 5 analyses the model result and Section 6
concludes.
2. Literature review
The theory of interbank market and systemic risk is first discussed by Bhattacharya
and Gale (1987). They examine the effect of customers’ preference shocks on a
multi-bank system. However, they do not examine the network effect. Allen and Gale
(2000) model financial contagion based on Diamond and Dybivg (1983) in a regular
network3. They argue that if a bank has more links with other banks the initial impact
of a financial crisis in that bank may be attenuated since each of its neighbours takes a
small hit when the bank has a run. In other words, a “complete” financial network is
more resilient than an “incomplete” one. Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000) consider
financial contagion in payment systems. Banks face liquidity shocks because
depositors are uncertain about the location where they are going to consume in the
future. Banks create financial interconnections by extending credit lines to one
another in order to deal with depositors’ consumption needs. In their model, a
financial crisis can arise as a result of a coordination failure among depositors. If
depositors believe that there will not be enough resources in their future location, they
will liquidate their investment in their original location, making it optimal for
depositors in other regions to do the same. Banks are exposed to a positive probability
3 For detailed discussion of Diamond and Dybig (1983) and Allen and Gale (2000) see also Allen and
Gale (2007).
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of contagion if the failure of one bank triggers a domino effect. In the last part of their
paper they have a general discussion on “money centre” banks and its systemic
importance4. However, they do not examine the effect of core periphery structure on
the financial contagion in detail.
Some other researchers applied statistical physics to study contagion in complex
network as in epidemiological literature (see Gai and Kapadia, 2010, Gai et al, 2010
and Haldane and May, 2011). These studies point out that high connectivity could
reduce the likelihood of contagion. However, shocks could have significant impact if
the failed banks are “super-spreaders”. They hence emphasize the important role of
core banks in ensuring the stability of financial network.
As for the empirical evidence on financial network, Upper and Worm (2004) find
that the current German banking system exhibits two-tier characteristic. Lower tier
banks connect only one of the upper tier banks and upper tier banks have transactions
with a variety of other banks. Craig and Peter (2010) have similar finding. In addition,
they show that The German interbank network fits the core-periphery model eight
times better than Erdos-Renyi random graphs and about two times better than scale
free networks. Boss et al (2004) find that the degree distribution of Austrian interbank
link follows power law and the clustering coefficient is relatively small compared
with other social network, such as network of actors’ collaboration or sexual contact.
This means that two banks that have interbank relations with a third bank have very
low probability of having interbank connection with one another. Bech and Atalay
(2008) also find in the U.S. the federal fund network follows a fat-tailed degree
distribution, with most banks having few counterparties and a small number having
many.
4 In their model “money centre” banks are core banks that suffer high liquidity shock relative to
periphery banks. In this sense, our paper combines Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000) and Allen and
Gale (2000) in order to examine the systemic risk in core-periphery network.
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3. The Model
The model extends Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Allen and Gale (2000). The
economy consists of four regions, i = A, B, C, and D. Each region consists of four
sectors, i1, i2, i3 and i45. There are three dates, t = 0, 1, 2. In each sector there are a
large number of ex ante identical consumers each endowed with one unit of a
homogeneous consumption good at date 0 but nothing at 1 and 2. Consumers have
different liquidity preferences at date 1. Early consumers only value consumption at
date 1, C1, whereas late consumers only consume at date 2, C2. They are uncertain
about their type at date 0.
There are short-term assets and long-term assets. One unit of consumption good
invested in a short asset in period t will result in one unit of consumption good in
period t+1. The long asset has a high return, R > 1, but requires two periods to mature.
The long asset can be liquidated, however, at date 1 at scrap value 0 < r < 1. In each
sector there are many banks, so that banks maximize depositors’ ex ante expected
utility.
Consumers have Diamond–Dybvig preferences: with probability ω they are early 
consumers, with utility of u(C1); with 1-ω they are late consumers, with utility of 
u(C2). The utility function is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable,
increasing and strictly concave. The probability ω varies within and across regions. 
The realization of the probabilities depends on the state of nature.
There are two equally likely states: S1 and S2. The aggregate early and late demand
for liquidity is constant in each state, but the liquidity shock fluctuates in each sector
and region. There are two different types of banks in terms of the variance of the early
consumers in the economy. Bank i1 faces four times higher volatility of early and late
5 Note that this assumption does not affect the model result as long as there are heterogeneous levels of
liquidity shock in different region.
consumers than banks i2, i3 and i4 ex ante. Bank i1s are negatively correlated with the
rest of the banks in the same region, and each bank i1 is perfectly positively correlated
with one of the other bank i1s and perfectly negatively correlated with the other two
bank i1s.
A1 A2 A3 A4
S1 ω4H= λ+4Δ ωL=λ-Δ ωL=λ-Δ ωL= λ-Δ 
S2 ω4L= λ-4Δ ωH=λ+Δ ωH=λ+Δ ωH=λ+Δ 
B1 B2 B3 B4
S1 ω4L= λ-4Δ ωH=λ+Δ ωH=λ+Δ ωH= λ+Δ 
S2 ω4H= λ+4Δ ωL=λ-Δ ωL=λ-Δ ωL=λ-Δ 
C1 C2 C3 C4
S1 ω4H= λ+4Δ ωL=λ-Δ ωL=λ-Δ ωL= λ-Δ 
S2 ω4L= λ-4Δ ωH=λ+Δ ωH=λ+Δ ωH=λ+Δ 
D1 D2 D3 D4
S1 ω4L= λ-4Δ ωH=λ+Δ ωH=λ+Δ ωH= λ+Δ 
S2 ω4H= λ+4Δ ωL=λ-Δ ωL=λ-Δ ωL=λ-Δ 
Let ω4H and ω
and ωH and ωL d
the average dem
consumers, we t17
4
L denote the probabilities of a liquidity shock at date 1 for bank i1,
enote the probabilities of a liquidity shock for banks i2, i3 and i4. Let
and for the liquidity be λ, which is also the average fraction of early
hen have
4 4/ 2 / 2H L H L       
TABLE 1: Liquidity shock in the economy
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and
4 4
4 4
H L
H L
   
   
 
      
(see Table 1). All uncertainty is resolved at date 1. A consumer’s type is not
observable, so late consumers can always mimic the actions of early consumers.
3.1 Central Planner’s Allocation
Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, the incentive for efficient allocation is the
same as the first-best allocation for a social planner. At date 0 each consumer has an
equal probability of being an early or a late consumer, the expected utility is:
 2,1)()1()( 21  iSCuCuE i
The central planner chooses a portfolio subject to the feasibility constraint:
1 yx (1)
where x and y denote the per capita amounts invested in the long and short assets,
respectively. Then the feasibility constraint in period 1 is:
yC 1 (2)
and the feasibility constraint in period 2 is:
RxC  2)1(  (3)
The central planner maximizes consumers’ expected utility subject to three constraints:
(1), (2) and (3). We can realize that the first-best allocation satisfies the first-order
condition )(')(' 21 CuCu  . Otherwise, the objective function could be increased by
using the short asset to shift some consumption from early to late consumers. Thus,
the first-best allocation satisfies the incentive constraint 21 CC  , which says that late
consumers find it weakly optimal to reveal their true type rather than pretend to be
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early consumers. In order to achieve the first best, the social planner has to transfer
liquidities across regions in periods 1 and 2.
To illustrate, in state S1, there is a ω4H fraction of early consumers in banks A1 and
C1 and ω4L in regions B1 and D1. Each bank has 1C units of short assets. So, banks
A1 and C1 each have an excess demand for 4 1( )H C  units of consumption and
banks B1 and D1 each have an excess supply of 4 41 1( ) ( ) 4L HC C       
units of consumption. There is a ωH fraction of early consumers in banks B2, B3, B4,
D2, D3 and D4 and each has an excess demand for 1( )H C  units of consumption.
There are ωL early consumers in banks A2, A3, A4, D2, D3 and D4 and each has an
excess supply of 1 1( ) ( )L HC C        . In period 2 the transfers flow in the
opposite direction.
3.2 Decentralized Allocation
We can show that the first-best allocation can be decentralized by a competitive
banking sector. The aggregate early and late demand for liquidity is constant, but the
number of early and late consumers fluctuates randomly in each region. This
motivates banks to have interbank deposits as insurance so that banks with liquidity
surpluses provide liquidity for regions with liquidity shortages. Here we assume that
banks form links within the same region first, before they form regional links6. Thus,
in the first round of network formation, banks i2, i3 and i4 have an incentive to
deposit in bank i1, since they are negatively correlated with i1; see figure 2. In this
case, banks i2, i3 and i4 each deposit Δ amount in bank i1, and bank i1 also deposit Δ  
6 This priority formation rule can be justified in a richer model where interbank insurance requires the
monitoring cost; in this case, banks in the same region are preferred since they are locally adjacent
which requires relatively low cost to monitor than banks in other regions.
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in banks i2, i3 and i4. In the network topology, we have a star network in each region
in which i1 is the hub or core in each region which connects every other bank in the
region, whereas other banks only connect to i1.
After the first-round exchange of deposits, banks with low volatility of early
consumers are completely insured. Banks with high volatility can achieve complete
insurance by forming links with banks in other regions which also have high volatility.
Let us assume that core banks in different regions do not know with which banks they
are positively or negatively correlated. In this case, the only equilibrium is that core
banks will exchange Δ/2 amount of deposit with each other in order to reach complete 
insurance. Figure 4 shows the liquidity risk sharing network with heterogeneous
liquidity shocks. In terms of the network topology, it is a standard core–periphery
network consisting of two types of nodes: hub nodes connect to each other and to all
the peripheral nodes in their region, whereas peripheral nodes have a single link each
and this link is with a hub node.
i1
i3
i2
i4
Figure 3
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Without loss of generality, suppose we face state 1, in which banks A1 and C1 have
a high demand for liquidity ω4H, and banks B2, B3, B4, D2, D3 and D4 have a high
liquidity demand of ωH. They liquidate all their deposits in other regions to satisfy the
liquidity demand. Banks A1 and C1 in period 1 have y units of the short asset, claims
of Δ deposits from each bank in their own region and Δ/2 claims from banks in other 
regions. They must pay C1 to the fraction ω4H of early consumers and also Δ/2 to each 
other. Their budget constraint in period 1 should be:
4
1 1 1( / 2) 3 3 / 2H C y C C        (4)
Given LH   and 4 4H    , the equation can be simplified to the
social planner’s budget constraint at date 1:
yC 1
Banks B2, B3, B4, D2, D3 and D4 also have y units of the short asset and claims of Δ 
from banks B1 and D1. They have to pay C1 to the fraction ωH of early consumers.
Thus, the budget constraint should be:
1 1H C y C    (5)
This again implies:
yC 1
A1
C1
B1
D1
A2 A3 A4 B2 B3 B4
C2 C3 C4 D2 D3 D4
Figure 4
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As for banks B1 and D1, they each face a demand of ω4L fraction of early consumers
from their own sector, Δ amount of deposit from their own region and Δ/2 from each 
of their negatively correlated regions. The supply of the liquidity is just the short asset
y. The budget constraint has to satisfy:
4
1( 3 2 / 2)L C y      (6)
Since 4 4L    , we then have:
yC 1
Banks A2, A3, A4, C2, C3 and C4 have to pay C1 to the fraction ωL of early
consumers in their own sector, and also Δ to bank A1 or bank C1. They have y units
of the short asset. The budget constraint has to be:
1( )L C y    (7)
This also implies:
yC 1
At date 2, banks A1 and C1 pay C2 to the fraction (1- ω4H) of late consumers in their
own sector, pay back the Δ deposits from each of the three banks in their own region 
and face the withdrawal of Δ/2 fraction of deposits from each negatively correlated 
region. They have Rx units of the long asset to meet these demands. So, the budget
constraint for banks A1 and C1 in period 2 is:
4
2(1 ) 3 2 / 2H C Rx        (8)
This again can be simplified into the social planner’s constraint:
RxC  2)1( 
Banks B2, B3, B4, D2, D3 and D4 in period 2 each faces the demand of (1- ωH)
fraction of late consumers in their own sector and Δ from B1 or D1, valued at C2.
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They have, again, Rx units of the long asset to meet this demand. The budget
constraint has to satisfy:
2(1 )H C Rx    (9)
We then have:
RxC  2)1( 
As for Banks B1 and D1, they each have to pay C2 to (1-ω4L) fraction of early
consumers from their own sector. The supply of the liquidity is the long asset Rx,
withdrawal of Δ amount of deposit from each bank in its own region and Δ/2 from 
each negatively correlated region. The budget constraint has to satisfy:
4
2 2 2(1 ) 3 2 / 2L C Rx C C      (10)
We again have:
RxC  2)1( 
Finally, banks A2, A3, A4, C2, C3 and C4 have to pay C2 to the fraction (1-ωL) of
early consumers in their own sector. They have Rx units of the long asset and claims
of Δ from their regional core bank. The budget constraint is: 
2 2(1 )L C Rx C    (11)
This also implies:
RxC  2)1( 
4. Financial Contagion
Interbank deposit exchange works well as long as there is enough liquidity in the
banking system as a whole. The financial linkages caused by these cross holdings can
turn out to be disastrous if there is an excess demand for liquidity. In this section, we
examine financial contagion by assuming a failure of one bank. Before doing so, we
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have to note that banks have a particular order in which to liquidate assets, a pecking
order that says that in order to meet the liquidity demand, a bank liquidates short
assets first, then deposits from other banks and finally long assets. Intuitively,
liquidating short assets is the least costly since one unit of the short asset is worth one
unit of consumption today, and also one unit of consumption tomorrow. By
liquidating one unit of deposits, a bank gives up C2 units of period 2 consumption and
receives C1 units of period 1consumption. Thus, the cost of liquidating is 12 / CC .
Given the first-order condition )(')(' 21 CRuCu  , we have 1/ 12 CC . By liquidating
long assets, a bank obtains r units of present consumption but gives up R units of
future consumption. Given that r is small enough, we then have:
1// 12  CCrR
A bank becomes bankrupt if it liquidates all its long assets and still cannot meet the
liquidity demand at date 1. If a bank fails, the value of a deposit in period 1 is no
longer C1; instead, it is equal to the liquidation value of all the bank’s assets. Let q
denote the value of the representative bank’s deposits in period 1. If q < C1, then all
the depositors (early and late customers, and deposit banks in other regions) withdraw
at date 1. Every depositor receives q from the failed bank for each unit invested at
date 0.
4.1 Shock on Core Bank
We first examine the propagation of a liquidity shock originating from the failure of
one of the core banks. Suppose there is third state in which the average demand for
liquidity in period 1 is greater than that in states 1 and 2. In this state, every region has
the previous average demand for liquidity λ except for bank A1, in which the demand
for liquidity is   . Assuming that this state occurs with zero probability, the
25
allocation in period 0 does not change7. Bank A1 has yC 1 units of the short asset,
but there is excess demand for 1C . In accordance with the pecking order, no bank
wants to liquidate the long assets if it can be avoided; the only equilibrium is one in
which bank A1 will liquidate its deposit from its neighbours A2, A3, A4, B1, C1 and
D1, and its neighbours will redeem the claim from A1 in order to meet their liquidity
demand. The mutual withdrawal simply cancels out the effect of interbank insurance
when there is an aggregate shock. Bank A1 has to meet the excess demand by
liquidating some of its long assets. A bank could meet the excess demand of liquidity
in period 1 by liquidating some of its long asset up to the point at which C1 = C2 (if
C1 > C2 late consumers would be better off withdrawing in period 1). Therefore, a
bank with a fraction of λ of early consumers must keep at least RC /)1( 1 units of
long assets to satisfy the late consumers in period 2. The capital buffer is:





 

R
CxrCB 1)1( 
The capital buffer for A1 is:
1
1
(1 )
A
CCB r x
R
   
   
Bank A1 will not become bankrupt if and only if the capital buffer in bank A1 is
greater than or equal to the excess demand of liquidity 1C :
1 1ACB C
In this case, bank A1 is safe but the late consumers in A1 are worse off because the
value of period 2 consumption is less than C2. If that this condition is violated, all its
consumers and neighbouring banks withdraw in period 1. Since the liquidity shock
happened at the beginning of date 1, it is reasonable to assume that the banks’ action
7 Note that the assumption of probability zero event is crucial for the model, because otherwise the ex
ante interbank risk sharing can be different if the probability is positive. See Allen and Gale (2000) for
the discussion on the difficulty of imposing positive probability.
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is consistent with the first best in period 0. The value of deposits in bank A1 is then
qA1, which is less than C1. The total demand for liquidity is 1 from its own depositors,
3Δ from its neighbours in its own region and 3Δ/2 from neighbours in other regions. 
The total liability demand in region A is then (1+3Δ+3Δ/2) qA1. The total assets in A1
are short assets y, x units of long assets, 3Δ from its neighbours and 3Δ/2 deposits in 
each region. The assets are valued at
2 3 4 1 1 1/ 2 / 2 / 2A A A B C Dy rx q q q q q q            
Assuming that all banks, except A1, are safe, in equilibrium we then have:
1 1 1 13 3 / 2
1 3 3 / 2
A A
U
y rx C Cq q      
   
(12)
where bank 1AUq is the upper bound on the value of the deposits in A1 under.
8 A1’s
neighbours in the same region (A2, A3 and A4) will be safe if and only if:
1
1
1
1
( )
( )
A
A
U
C y CB q
C y CB q


     

     
where the left-hand side of the inequality is the demand of date 1 consumption in its
own sector plus the redeemed deposit from bank A1, and the right-hand side is the
total short assets available, consisting of short asset y, capital buffer
1(1 )CCB r x
R
 
   
and claims from bank A1 valued at 1AUq
9. Given yC 1 ,
and substituting out 1AUq , this inequality implies that
8 In what follows, we use the upper-bound value to derive the contagion threshold. It would be easier
than working out all the liquidation values, which are determined by the equilibrium condition when
there is bankruptcy in period 1. As we will see later, this assumption does not affect the model result.
9 Note that all banks, except the failed bank, have the same capital buffer since they face the same
liquidity demand, λ, in the first period.
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1
1
1
( )
( )
1 3 3 / 2
A
UC q CB
C y rx CB
  

 
 
   
(13)
If condition 13 fails then all the banks in region A will fail.
We then consider the contagion threshold on bank A1’s neighbours across regions,
B1, C1 and D1. The only difference between regional and cross-regional neighbours
is the amount of deposits they have in bank A1. They will not become bankrupt if and
only if:
1
1 1 1( 3 3 / 2) 3 2 / 2 / 2
A
UC y CB C C q            
This again implies:
1
1
1
/ 2( )
/ 2( )
1 3 3 / 2
A
UC q CB
C y rx CB
  

 
 
   
(14)
Supposing the inequality does not hold, then all the core banks fail. The liquidity
shock will continue to propagate to all the banks in the economy. To illustrate this
situation, let bank B1’s liquidation value be qB1. The total demand of liquidity is
(1+3Δ+3Δ/2)qB1, and the total liquidity supply is 11 13 /2 2 /2
A
Uy rx C q C      . The
liquidation value of bank B1 is determined by:
1
1 1 1 13 / 2 2 / 2
1 3 3 / 2
A
B B U
U
y rx C q Cq q        
   
(15)
where 1BUq is the upper-bound liquidation value. Banks B2, B3 and B4 are safe if and
only if:
1
1
1
1
( )
( )
B
U
B
U
C y CB q
C q CB
      

  
(16)
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However, this inequality cannot hold. We can show that as long as condition 14 is
violated, it must be true that condition 13 cannot hold. Given that 1BUq in equation 15
is always less than qUA1 in equation 12, it implies that the inequality 16 cannot hold as
long as condition 14 fails.
4.2 Shock on Peripheral Bank
We now consider financial contagion given a failure of one of the peripheral banks,
say A2. Assuming that there is a state four, in which every bank has the average
demand for liquidity λ except for bank A2, which faces liquidity demand λ+ε. As
before, bank A2 becomes bankrupt if and only if its capital buffer is less than the
value of excess liquidity demand 1C . The value of the period 1 deposit in bank A2
becomes qA2, which is again less than C1. The value of deposits is determined by the
equilibrium condition in which the demand is 1 from its own consumers and Δ from
neighbouring bank A1 and the supply is 1Ay rx q   . Assuming that bank A1 is safe,
we have:
2 2 1
1
A A
U
y rx Cq q    
 
(17)
where 2AUq is the upper bound of the liquidation value. A1will be safe if and only if:
CBrxyC
CCqCByC A






)
1
(
2/32)2/33(
1
11
2
1
(18)
If condition 18 fails, the liquidity shock will propagate to all the banks in region A
and all the other regions’ central node in the economy. Bank A1’s upper-bound
liquidation value, if it fails, is:
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2
1 1 1 12 3 / 2
1 3 3 / 2
A
A A U
U
y rx q C Cq q        
   
(19)
Let us first consider the contagion within region A. Banks A3 and A4 will be safe if
and only if:
1
1
2
1 1
( )
( )
1 3 3 / 2
A
U
A
U
C y CB q
C C q y rx CB
      

     
      
(20)
Substituting (17) into condition (20) we have:
1( )(1 2 )
(1 )(1 3 3 / 2)
C y rx CB            
(21)
If condition 21 fails then all the banks in region A will fail.
As for regional contagion, banks B1, C1 and D1 will not fail as long as:
1
1 1 1
2
1 1
( 3 3 / 2) / 2 3 2 / 2
( )/ 2
1
A
U
A
U
C y CB q C C
C C q y rx CB
            

     
  
  
(22)
Again, substituting (17) into (22), we have:
1( )(1 2 )
2 (1 )(1 3 3 / 2)
C y rx CB            
(23)
Supposing this condition does not hold, then all the peripheral banks will suffer from
a liquidity shock. For example, the failure of B1 means its liquidation value is
1
1 1 1 13 2 / 2 / 2
1 3 3 / 2
A
B B U
U
y rx C C qq q        
   
(24)
The peripheral banks will all fail unless:
1
1
1
1 1
( )
/ 2( )
1 3 3 / 2
B
U
A
C y CB q
C C q y rx CB
      

     
      
(25)
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Substituting (19) and (17) into condition (25), we have:
2
1
2
( )(2 12 11 )
2 (1 )(1 3 3 / 2)
C y rx CB
      
       
Rearranging the condition by multiplying (1 2 )  in the numerator and denominator,
we have:
2
1
2
( )(1 2 ) (2 12 11 )
132 (1 )(1 3 3 / 2) (1 9 )
2
C y rx CB
 
        
 
         
 
(26)
5. Analysis
When one of the core banks, A1, fails, it affects a considerable proportion of the
banks in the economy simply because it has many neighbours in which only the later
consumers all suffer from the shock, assuming that all the banks are safe. Otherwise,
since condition (14) is more likely to hold relative to (13), the core banks in other
regions are relatively more likely to survive than the peripheral banks in region A.
Given two types of bank facing the same liquidation value from bank A1, it implies
that the lower the amount of deposits put into the failed bank, the lower the likelihood
of being affected by the liquidation. The central nodes in other regions can act as a
buffer for their peripheral nodes to be immune from the shock. Note that once
condition (14) fails, then all the core banks will fail and in turn all the banks in the
economy will fail. This is because the liquidation value of B1- 1BUq is less than 1AUq ,
thus condition (13) is more likely to hold relative to condition (16). We then have:
Proposition: Once all the core banks fail, all banks in this connected network fail.
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When one of the peripheral banks, A2, fails, the core bank, A1, will not fail if and
only if condition (18) holds, otherwise A1 would become bankrupt and its neighbour
would receive its liquidation value, which is 1AUq at the upper bound. Given 0 1   ,
conditions (18) and (21) imply that 2 1A AU Uq q . This shows that the failure of A1 does
not necessarily lead to the failure of the whole region. This result implies that the
worth of liquidation not only depends on the amount of deposits a bank has in the
failed bank, but it also depends on the number of links the failed bank has. Essentially,
the more links a bank has, the higher the liquidation value it yields relative to
low-degree banks, when it is bankrupt.
Conditions (21) and (23) again imply that even if all the banks in region A fail, it is
still possible for the other regions to be safe. Core banks act like a buffer to ensure the
safety of their peripheries. Given 0 1   , condition (26) is less likely to hold relative
to condition (23), which implies that once the core fails, all the banks in the economy
will fail. Note that if we order the liquidation values, given that all the values are less
than C1, we can find that 2 1 1A A BU U Uq q q  , which means the liquidation value that banks
B2, B3 and B4 receive is higher than the value B1 receives from A1. However, since
B1 has a smaller proportion of deposits in A1 than the peripheries have in B1, the
total worth of liquidation is less than B1 received from A1.
Our model result, to some extent, is similar to the finding of robustness of network
resilience to a disturbance in a complex network. Albert et al. (2000) and Crucitti et al.
(2004) find that core–periphery networks are robust to random failures, but vulnerable
to targeted attacks, due to their heterogeneous topologies. In other words,
core–periphery networks display great stability even if they are confronted by a large
number of repeated small failures on peripheral nodes, while at the same time major
damage can be triggered by attacking central nodes. Apparently, given that the capital
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buffer is big enough, the failure of a core bank, say A1, will trigger a considerable
amount of late consumers suffering from the initial shock simply because the hub has
many neighbours relative to the periphery. In contrast, the failure of a peripheral bank
only affects its regional core bank, given a big enough capital buffer.
6. Conclusion
This chapter extends Allen and Gale’s (2000) model to a core–periphery network
structure. In Allen and Gale’s (2000) study, a shock to any of the banks has the same
effect on other banks, due to homogenous characteristics of liquidity shocks. We
show that in a core–periphery network, a shock to the periphery has a different
contagion process from a shock to one of the hubs. In their paper, Proposition 2 shows
that as long as the neighbour of the failed bank becomes bankrupt, then all the banks
in the connected network fail. In other words, a shock to a single bank can either bring
down the entire banking system or no bank collapses. This is because all the banks in
Allen and Gale’s research (2000) hold the same amount of interbank deposits and
have the same number of neighbours. In our model, we show that the liquidation
value not only depends on the amount of claims one has on the troubled bank, but also
on how many neighbours the troubled bank has; the more neighbours it has, the higher
the liquidity value it produces when it bankrupts and the higher the contagion
threshold. Thus, financial contagion behaves differently in a core–periphery network
– even if the neighbour of a failed bank fails, it is not necessarily the case that all
banks fail. The combination of our result and Allen and Gale’s result is backed by
evidence put forward by Albert et al. (2000), who argue that heterogeneous and
homogeneous topologies react very differently to increasing levels of damage.
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However, the model does not include much strategic behaviour. Since we assume
no aggregate shock and cost of forming and maintaining a link, the formation of a
financial network does not seem so interesting. We could adopt an equilibrium
concept from a network theory in economics, such as pair-wise stability or bilateral
equilibrium, to analyse the incentive of network formation.
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Chapter 2
Financial networks, “Too Systemic to Fail” and Regulatory
Policy
Summary
This chapter studies how financial regulation can affect network formation when the
government suffers from time-inconsistency problem of bailing out systemically
important bank. We argue that if interbank deposits are guaranteed, the equilibrium
structure of the network is different from the one under market discipline. We show
that under market discipline individual banks can collectively increase the
interconnectedness of the financial network by using interbank intermediation. The
new equilibrium network can effectively increase the severity of systemic risk ex post,
hence increasing the possibility that the government will bail out the insolvent bank.
If intermediation is costly the network has core-periphery property. The chapter
suggests that if the financial regulatory policy is based on representative agent model
or a given network structure, it may ignore the effect of banks’ interaction such that
the resulting new equilibrium network can make this policy ineffective.
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1. Introduction
Financial networks, formed by the connections between banks, are crucial for
reallocating the liquidity from banks having cash in excess to those facing liquidity in
demand 10 . However, these connections can also induce contagious failure and
systemic risk such that the failure of one bank can lead to the failure of many other
banks in a sequential fashion.
In this chapter, we study how financial regulation can affect bank behaviour in
forming financial networks when the government suffers from a time-inconsistency
problem in bailing out systemically important banks11. In particular, we show how the
implementation of market discipline12 - by subordinating interbank debt - can give
individual banks the incentive to form an equilibrium network that is “too systemic to
fail”.
To study how network formation can be affected by regulatory policy, we assume
banks suffer from independent liquidity and solvency shocks. The liquidity shock
gives banks the incentive to form a risk-sharing network by exchanging interbank
deposits ex ante, as in Allen and Gale (2000). However, banks in the network could
also suffer from contagious failure if any one bank is hit by an idiosyncratic solvency
10 We study a financial network induced by credit extension between banks, rather than a payment and
settlement system, such as CHAPS in the UK, in which the determinants of network structure involve
legal and technological factors. Credit extensions, unlike payments, do not cease to exist after they
have been made, so the structure of the resulting network is of greater relevance for financial stability
(see Craig and Peter (2010) and Kahn and Roberts (2009)).
11 In this chapter a bailout refers to the government’s act of injecting capital to the bank hit by a
solvency shock. The government in this context refers to the authority who implements the bailout,
such as FDIC in the US or the Treasury in the UK.
12 Market discipline refers to a “market based” incentive scheme in which investors in bank liabilities,
such as subordinated debt or uninsured deposits, monitor banks for their risk taking by demanding
higher yields on these liabilities. The reason market discipline is needed is that banks are believed to
engage in moral hazard behaviour. Banks collect deposits and invest these funds in risky assets. But the
bank’s own solvency target may not take into account the interests of depositors, nor of society as a
whole. As a result, banks may engage in excessive risk taking. Market discipline is deemed to be a
mechanism that can potentially curb the incentive to take excessive risk, by making risk taking more
costly for banks, see Nier and Baumann (2006). In this paper we do not model the effect of market
discipline on individual bank’s risking taking behaviour explicitly. However, our model result implies
that the market discipline may not be effective for limiting banks’ risk taking incentives if the
government suffers from time-inconsistency problems.
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shock; and, if the systemic risk triggered by the insolvency of an individual bank is
severe, the government may well bail out the insolvent bank ex post13.
Before the early 1990s interbank deposits were implicitly or explicitly guaranteed
(as discussed later in the next section), so that no bank would suffer from contagious
failure. Because such guarantees ensure that an individual solvency shock does not
impose any negative externalities to other banks, this implies that there are effectively
no systemically important banks. In these circumstances banks have every incentive
to form a network that shares the liquidity risks; and we show that, for ex ante
identical banks, the most stable structure is a symmetric bipartite network with many
components.
If the interbank deposit guarantee is removed, however, government’s no bailout
commitment is no longer credible due to the risk of contagious failure. In this case,
individual banks must take three issues into account when forming a network:
liquidity risk sharing, contagious failure due to an individual solvency shock and the
government’s incentive to bail out systemically important banks. We show that banks
may act strategically so as to increase the interconnectedness of the network via
interbank intermediation, so that an individual solvency shock will cause systemic
risk and trigger a bailout of the insolvent bank. Moreover, if interbank intermediation
is costly, there would be an agglomeration effect that generates a core-periphery
network.
Our model is supported by the recent empirical findings on the financial network
structure. They show that before early 1990s, the financial network structures were
13 See Mishkin (1995), Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (1998), and Freixas (1999), Hoggarth, Reidhill and
Sinclair (2004), they emphasize that the rationale behind “Too Big to Fail” rescue is that governments
bail out financial institutions on the grounds that it eliminates negative externalities to other financial
institutions who have credit exposure with the troubled bank. If they do not do so, contagious failure
can leads to systemic risk which disrupt the proper functioning of the financial system as a whole. We
will discuss this issue in detail later.
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symmetric in many developed economies where each individual bank possesses more
or less similar number of links with other banks for interbank liquidity insurance14.
Banks were structurally equivalent with each other. In particular, banks either lend or
borrow at a time with no apparent role of interbank intermediaries (see Craig and
Peter (2010)). They also show that there is network structure evolution happened
during late 1990s where the financial network evolved from symmetric one to the
current network which exhibits core-periphery structure where core bank
intermediates between peripheral banks that do not extend credit among themselves
directly. The core bank not only acts as a financial intermediary transferring fund
from depositors to the real economy, but also as an interbank intermediary
transferring liquidities for periphery banks15.
This chapter implies that ex ante identical agents can form an asymmetric risk
sharing network structure. It is because the equilibrium network with asymmetry is
not necessarily the result of some underlying heterogeneities among players, rather it
can be the result of the interaction under certain network externalities and regulations.
The financial network structural change can be the result of the change of individual
banks’ interacting behaviour due to the change of regulatory policy. Our result thus
has a normative implication for financial regulation. If financial regulation is derived
from representative agent models or by treating the network structure as exogenously
given, it may ignore the effect of banks’ interaction such that a new equilibrium
14 See Degryse and Nguyen (2004), Mistulli (2005) and Manna and Iazzetta (2009).
15 See Upper and Worm (2004), and Craig and Peter (2010) for the analysis of German financial
network, Boss et al (2004) and Degryse and Nguyen (2004) for Belgium, Mistulli (2005) and Manna
and Iazzetta (2009) for Italy, and Bech and Atalay (2008) for the U.S.
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network can make this regulatory policy ineffective and high probability of systemic
risk16.
This chapter contributes to the existing literatures in three aspects. First, it is the
first to examine financial network with interbank intermediaries. Second, this is the
first to analyse the effect of financial regulatory policy on the network formation.
Third, the chapter gives one possible explanation on the financial network evolution
during 1990s.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the intuition behind market
discipline and the government’s bailout policy. Section 3 discusses the related
literature. Section 4 presents the network and network equilibrium concept. Section 5
analyses the model. Section 6 examines the network formation game under interbank
deposit guarantee. Section 7 studies the network formation if the guarantee is removed,
but the government has time-inconsistency problem. Section 8 discusses the model
results, and section 9 concludes. The appendices and references are included in the
last two sections respectively.
2. Market Discipline and Bailout Policy
Banking theories in the 1980s were mostly based on representative agent models, such
as those of Bryan (1980), Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Diamond (1984) and Jacklin
and Bhattacharya (1988). They consider the delegated monitoring role played by
financial institutions in minimizing financial intermediation costs and curbing fund
borrowers’ moral hazard problems. These models demonstrate that financial crises
16 This argument is akin to the second best theory in which it is not necessarily welfare improving if
one distortion is removed, given there are many distortions in the economy. The regulator wanted to
solve for principle-agent problem whereas accentuated the systemic risk due to time-inconsistent
bailout. See also Torre and Ize (2009)
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can be induced by a panic-based bank run. They hence support the idea that deposit
insurance can help the banking system to prevent bank runs which can severe the
economy’s ability to channel funds to those with productive investment opportunities.
However, the deposit insurance accentuates the bank owners’ moral hazard
problem, because losses were incurred that were not borne by them. The moral hazard
problem provides a powerful rationale for financial regulation. In 1988, Basel 1 was
introduced in order to regulate individual banks, so that the expected losses to the
government insurer were minimized. The fundamental principle of the Basel Capital
Accord is that bank failures are bad for the economy, so that the goal of financial
regulation and the associated principle of prompt corrective action are meant to ensure
that such failures are avoided (see Kashyap, Rojan and Stein 2008). The Basel Capital
Accord does not consider regulation for interbank lending. Nevertheless, according to
the Basel’s principle, since bank failures are socially costly, interbank defaults can
cause uncertainties about the solvency of other financial institutions, which can cause
contagious failure, so it is better to avoid them.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, governments often made implicit or explicit
guarantees of repayments for depositors in the interbank market. In the U.S., sellers of
fed funds to insolvent institutions were often protected by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). King (2008) shows that banks recovered high
percentage of their principal if their counterparties failed before early 1990s. Stern
and Feldman (2004) show that, between 1979 and 1989, when roughly 1,100
commercial banks failed, 99.7% of all deposit liabilities were fully protected through
the discretionary actions of U.S. policymakers. Benston and Kaufman (1998) show
that uninsured depositors were protected in nearly 90% of the bank failures until early
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1990s17. Sironi (2001) shows the same situation in the European banking industries:
most bank failures never gave rise to direct losses to their creditors. Uninsured
interbank deposits were often paid off through implicit government bailout policies or
through explicit government guarantees.
One could argue that the government guarantee on interbank credit risk eliminates
the incentive for banks to monitor each other and that this encourages moral hazard
behaviour in the interbank market. In the early 1990s, Rochet and Tirole (1996)
developed a theory on interbank lending in decentralized system. They suggest that a
decentralized operation of interbank lending must be motivated by peer monitoring. In
the meantime, criticisms of Basel 1 also surged regarding to the non-risk based,
so-called ‘standard approach’ of financial regulation which ignores market discipline.
The implementation of market discipline is often deemed to increase banks’ credit
risk disclosure in order to encourage peer monitoring between banks18. While the first
two pillars in Basel 2 focus on credit risk capital requirements and on the future role
of national supervisors, the third pillar aims at strengthening the role of market
17 Note that, during this period, it was not just the large banks whose uninsured creditors received
guarantees on their deposits. Additional evidence that ‘too big to fail’ has not played the key role in
producing banking crises is provided by Thorsten Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Ross Levine (2005), who
do not find a positive relationship between banking system concentration and the likelihood of a
banking crisis. Although bank bailouts have been the source of serious moral hazard risk taking on the
part of banks that has led to very costly banking crises throughout the world, ‘too big to fail’ has not
played a dominant role in most banking crises. It was not dominant in most of the banking crises in
developed countries, with the U.S. S&L crisis being one notable example. The savings and loan crisis
was not caused to fail: none of these thrift institutions were sufficiently large to pose systemic risk from
one of their failures being too large. Instead, it was the result of the willingness of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board and its deposit insurance agency, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation, to prop up the entire savings and loan industry, including almost all small S&Ls (Kane
1989). It has been the political process which bails out almost all banking institutions that has been the
driving force behind banking crises (see Mishkin, 2006).
18 The emphasis on market discipline is based on two concerns: one is due to the financial innovation
that makes financial regulators difficult to monitor and control individual banks’ risk taking behaviour;
another one is that in order to reduce the incentives for financial regulation arbitrage, the Basel
Committee has proposed an ‘Internal Ratings Based’ (IRB) approach to capital requirements. This
capital adequacy regime gives banks liberty to determine their own capital ratio, but also leads to
possible risk taking behaviour, due to information asymmetry. The growing independence of bank
management in determining their own capital adequacy must therefore be accompanied by an
increasing role of market forces in monitoring banks’ risk profiles and influencing their management
decisions, thus creating market discipline. The relevance of this role to be played by each individual
bank and other private investors has been recognized by the Basel Committee itself.
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discipline by encouraging greater bank disclose on credit risk by means of such as
subordinating the interbank debt (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001)).
In the meantime, in the U.S., the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s
Improved Act (FDICIA) was introduced to impose a greater credit risk on uninsured
bank liability holders. The introduction of FDICIA in 1991 and National Depositor
Preference (NDP) legislation in 1994 mandated least-cost failure resolution and
subordinated fed funds to all domestic deposit liabilities and thus increased the
expected loss to fed funds sellers in the event of bankruptcy. In particular, prior to this
legislation, the pro rata share of a failed bank’s assets that was recovered by federal
funds lenders was the same as that received by other general creditors. NDP decreased
this share by subordinating fed-funds claims to uninsured depositors. Benston and
Kaufman (1998) show that uninsured depositors were protected in nearly 90% of the
bank failures in the 6 years preceding FDICIA; whereas in the 6 years following, the
figure dropped to around 30%.
King (2008), Furfine (2001) and Flannery and Rangan (2004) have found a
statistically significant yield response to credit risk in interbank market since
mid-1990s. In European banking industries, Sironi (2001, 2003) finds a significant
increase in subordinated debt since the mid 1990s19. However, these papers also show
that a sensitive credit risk will decrease if the borrowing banks are perceived to
19 Although there was no obvious regulation change in the European banking industry at that time,
Sironi points out, two effects could give rise to increasing concern of market discipline for individual
banks. One such effect was the loss that continental European countries’ central banks suffered as a
consequence of the EMU’s monetary policy. A lower degree of freedom in fiscal policy and a transfer
of monetary policy to the European Central Bank (ECB) meant that banks became less likely to receive
government guarantees. Secondly, the introduction of FDICIA in the U.S. and the criticism of risk
based Basel 1 with regard to its lack of market discipline gave rational investors the perception that
financial regulators seek to impose greater credit risks on uninsured bank liability holders, by
withdrawing from implicit government guarantees. Regulatory and legislative changes in the early
1990s may have reduced the market’s perceived probability that a failed bank’s creditors would be
insured.
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receive the government bailout (see King (2008) and Sironi (2003)). The ‘Too Big to
Fail’ problem limits the incentive effects of market discipline.
However, as argued by Mishkin (1995), Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (1998), Freixas
(1999) and Hoggarth, Reidhill and Sinclair（2004）the fundamental reason to bail out
a bank is that it can eliminate the potential problem of contagion spreading to
connected financial institutions, which can lead to systemic risks otherwise. Rochet
and Tirole (1996) also argue that size of an individual bank per se cannot be the cause
of TBTF. It is more likely to be related to the individual banks’ systemic importance
in the financial system20. FDIC (1998) explains that the primary reason for its
decision to bail out Continental Illinois is to avoid systemic risks, such as occurred
with the failure of MCorp and the Bank of New England.21 Paul Volcker, then
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, argued that if they had not stepped in, the ultimate
systemic crisis that had affected so many other financial institutions would have
occurred and wiped out the Western financial system. The ‘Too Big to Fail’ problem
is better described as the “Too interconnected to Fail” (TITF) or ‘Too Systemic to Fail’
(TSTF) problem.
Stern and Feldman (2004) argue that FDICIA and other regulations have a
systemic risk exception. A bank can be, in effect, too interconnected so that both an
insured and uninsured deposit can be fully protected, which would otherwise have
serious adverse effects on financial stability. The lack of credibility of the
government’s commitment to bailing out a systemically important bank manifests
itself as a time-inconsistency problem. The following comment on the FDICIA by
20 Rochet and Tirole (1996) argue that large institutions such as Drexel and BCCI were allowed to fail
because their failure created little systemic risk, as they were somewhat disconnected from the rest of
the system.
21 The 1989 failure of MCorp led to the direct demise of 14 affiliated institutions, and the 1991 failure
of the Bank of New England directly triggered the failure of Connecticut Bank and Trust through losses
on federal funds sold.
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Alan Greenspan (2001) expresses the concern of central banks about the time
consistency problem: “expanded credit risk disclosure will be critical to enhanced
market discipline, but the additional information will be irrelevant unless
counterparties believe that they are, in fact, at risk.” Some empirical evidence found
by Nier and Baumann (2006) and Sironi (2001) also shows that the effect of
disclosure and uninsured funding is reduced when banks enjoy a high degree of
government support, pointing to the limits of the effectiveness of market discipline for
banks.
3. Related Literature
The first paper on network analysis of the interbank market is by Allen and Gale
(2000). The financial linkages between banks arise from the mutual insurance
arrangements against liquidity shock. Financial contagion can occur when there is an
excessive demand for liquidity in the economy. Since banks’ insurance arrangements
make them mutually dependent, this implies that a loss of value in one bank can cause
sufficient loss of value in other banks, so precipitating a run. They conclude that, if a
bank has more links with other banks, the initial impact of a financial crisis in that
bank may be attenuated since each of its neighbours takes a small hit when the bank
experiences a run. In other words a ‘complete’ financial network is more resilient than
an ‘incomplete’ one. Babus (2007) extends Allen and Gale’s model (2000) using a
network formation game. She shows that banks have an incentive to form links with
each other in order to insure against the liquidity shock and to reduce the risk of
contagion. Leitner (2005) considers the possibility of private bailouts in the financial
network. He shows that a bank’s investment return depends positively on the
investments of the banks connected to it. Hence, a private bailout is possible when
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there is a threat of contagion. The idea behind Leitner’s model is that banks can be
surprised by randomly distributed endowments from agents which can make at least
one bank in the network bankrupt. Therefore, an efficient financial network needs to
minimize the trade-off between the potential for contagion and risk sharing.
In other research studies, the network effect on financial stability is considered.
Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000) consider financial contagion in the payment system.
Banks face liquidity shocks because depositors are uncertain about where their future
locations for consumption are likely to be. Financial linkages are formed by extending
credit lines to one another in order to deal with regional liquidity shocks. In their
model, financial crisis arise as a result of a coordination failure among depositors. If
depositors believe that there will not be enough resources in their future location, they
will liquidate their deposits in their original location, making it necessary for
depositors in other regions to do the same. Banks are exposed to the positive
probability of contagion if the failure of one bank triggers a domino effect.
Cifuentes et al. (2005) developed a model of contagion in which price effect plays
an important role. They argue that the market for illiquid assets has a downward
sloping residual demand curve, so that more of the illiquid asset will sold by the banks
if the price is lower. There are two channels for contagion in their model. One is
through the usual bilateral exposures in the interbank market; the other is through the
effect of asset price changes on bank capital. Cifuentes et al. (2005) show that for
appropriate parameter values the price effect greatly amplifies the extent of contagion.
Other researchers, such as Gai and Kapadia. (2010) and Gai et al. (2010), have
applied statistical physics to study contagion in complex networks, as in
epidemiological literature. These studies focus on highly interconnected financial
networks, where shocks to “super-spreaders” can have significant systemic impact.
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With regard to empirical evidence in financial networks, Upper and Worm (2004)
show that the current German banking system can be divided into two tiers. Lower
tier banks connect with only one of the upper tier banks and upper tier banks
intermediate with a variety of other banks. Craig and Peter (2010) report similar
findings. Boss et al (2004) find that the degree of distribution of Austrian interbank
links follows a power law and its clustering coefficient is relatively small. This means
that two banks that have interbank relations with a third bank will have a very low
probability of having established interbank connections with each another. Bech and
Atalay (2008) also find that, in the U.S., the federal fund network follows a fat-tailed
degree distribution, with most banks having few counterparties and a small number
having many.
In addition to the above evidence, some researchers have examined the evolution of
the financial networks. Perhaps the most interesting findings are by Degryse and
Nguyen (2004), Manna and Iazzetta (2009) and Mistulli (2005). Degryse and Nguyen
(2004), report that, since the 1990s, the Belgian banking system has shifted away
from a symmetric network in which all banks have more or less symmetric exposure
to an incomplete network exhibiting core periphery characteristics. Manna and
Iazzetta (2009) and Mistulli (2005) also found that evidence for the evolution of the
banking system in Italy from symmetric structures towards an asymmetric core
periphery pattern since the 1990s.
The network formation game was first considered in terms of non-cooperative
game theory by Aumann and Myerson (1988) and Myerson (1977). However, the
drawback of this approach is that an empty network is always in a state of Nash
equilibrium. To address this issue, one has to consider the effect of coordinated
actions and coalitions. The concept of pairwise stability of Jackson and Wolinsky
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(1996) formalizes this idea: a network is pairwise stable if every link which is present
in the network is profitable for the players involved in it, and for every link which is
absent from the network it cannot be that both players are better off by forming the
link. While pairwise stability is a useful check for strategic stability, it only allows for
the deletion of a single link or the addition of a single link. This consideration leads to
many refinements of pairwise stability. Goyal and Joshi (2006) consider examples of
pairwise Nash stability whereby an individual can delete multiple links at the same
time, rather than just one at a time. Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) consider issues
related to coordination between two players and propose the establishment of a
bilateral equilibrium and strictly bilateral equilibrium. In this chapter we follow the
equilibrium concept by Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007).
4. Network and Equilibrium Concept
Every player makes an announcement of intended links. An intended link }1,0{ij , is
where 1ij indicates that player i intends to form a link with player j , while 0ij
means that player idoes not want to form such a link. A strategy of player i is given by
}}{{ \iNjiji   where N represents the set of the players. Let i denote the strategy set
of player i . We consider bilateral agreement of network formation, hence a link
between two players iand j will be formed if and only if 1 jiij  . We denote the
formed link by 1ijg and the absence of a link by 0ijg . A strategy profile
},...,,{ 21 n  therefore induces a network, denoting as )(g . Let G denote the set
of all networks, and }1,:{)(  iji gijNjgN represent the set of players with
whom player ihas a link in network g and )()( gNg ii  denote the cardinality of the
set.
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In network g , ijgg  denotes the network obtained by replacing 0ijg in network
g by 1ijg , while ijgg  denotes the network obtained by replacing 1ijg in network
g by 0ijg . A path between iand j in network g exists if either 1ijg or if there is a
distinct set of players },...,,{ 21 niii such that niiiiii ggg  ,...,21 . A network is
connected if a path exists between the pair Nji , . A network, gg ' is a
component of g if for all jigji  ,', , there exists a path in 'g connecting iand j , and
for all 'gi and gk , 1ikg implies 'gk  .
A network is said to be regular or symmetric if every node has the same number of
links, i.e. Nigi  ,)(  . A complete network is a symmetric network in which
1 n . A bipartite network is one for which N can be partitioned into the two sets
AN and BN , where BA NNN  , so that if 1ijg , then one of the nodes comes from
AN and other comes from BN . A minimally connected network is where there is at
most one path connecting any of the two nodes. A core-periphery network structure is
minimally connected which describes the following situation. Let )(1 g and )(gk
represent a division of nodes into two distinct groups, a node belongs to the same
group if and only if it has the same number of links to 1 or k. The nodes in )(1 g
constitute the periphery and have a single link with a node in )(gk ; nodes in the set
)(gk constitute the cores and are linked with a subset of nodes in )(1 g .
Let ),( jiiu  denote the payoff to player i . The strategy profile  1 2, ,... ,n      
can be said to have achieved a state of Nash equilibrium if
Niuu iiiiiiii   ,),,(),(
*** 
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In the model a link requires that both players agree to the formation of the link. It is
easy to see that an empty network is always a Nash. More generally, for any pair i
and j , it is always the best mutual response for a players to offer to form no link. To
avoid this potential coordination problem, in this chapter we use the concept of
bilateral equilibrium network and strictly bilateral equilibrium network, by Goyal and
Vega-Redondo (2007). A bilateral equilibrium network is a network where no agent
or pair of agents has the incentive to change its links. No single agent or pair of agents
can improve its situation by breaking a link, and for any pair of agents, if one agent
could benefit from a new link, the second agent would not and hence the link would
not be formed. The bilateral equilibrium network is strict if the existence of deviations
that affect the network structure must also affect the payoff for each individual agent
involved22.
Definition 1: A network g is a bilateral equilibrium network if the following
conditions hold:
1. There is a Nash strategy profile which supports g so that
Niuu iiiiiiii   ,),,(),(
*** 
2. For every pair of players Nji , and every strategy pair ),( ji  , we have:
),,(),,(),,(),,( ******** jijijjijijjijiijijii uuuu   
Definition 2: A network g is a strict bilateral equilibrium network if the following
conditions hold:
22 The reason we impose two equilibrium concepts is because that strictly bilateral equilibrium yields
more stable network. In a dynamic network formation game strictly bilateral equilibrium is more
resilient to deviation than bilateral equilibrium. See Jackson (2007) Chapter 11 and Goyal (2008)
Chapter 7 for the discussion on the stability of network equilibrium concept.
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1. For any Ni and every ii  such that
),(),(),(),( ***** iiiiiiii uugg   
2. For every pair of players Nji , and every strategy pair ),( ji  , with
)(),,( **  gg jiji  we have
),,(),,(),,(),,( ******** jijijjijijjijiijijii uuuu   
From the definition we can see that strictly bilateral equilibrium is a bilateral
equilibrium.
5. The Model
Our model is a simplified version of Allen and Gale (2000) which explains the
premises for a network formation game23. The central aim of this section is to provide
a micro-foundation for the role of interbank market in reallocating liquidity in the
financial system and to construct a model in which a shock within a single bank can
propagate to other banks through interbank connections. Although the assumptions
seem stylized and restrictive, the model captures the nature of the interactions in a
financial network.
23In Allen and Gale’s (2000) setting, consumers have different liquidity preferences as in Diamond and
Dybvig (1983). Each region experiences random fluctuations of liquidity needs for early consumers.
They intend to show that the interbank market can decentralize the social planner’s solution if banks
with a high proportion of early consumers can borrow the liquidity from the banks that have a low
proportion of early consumers. Banks can insure themselves against liquidity shocks by exchanging
interbank deposits. In our model, we mainly focus on the structural change of financial network due to
incentive misalignment between individual banks and the government. We assume liquidity shocks is
due to the asset side of the economy, which gives similar insight to Allen and Gale (2000) regarding to
liquidity risk sharing.
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5.1 Consumers, Government, and Banks
Consider an economy which consists of n regions. In each region there is continuum
of consumers of measure 1. There are three time periods: 2,1,0t . At date 0, each
consumer is endowed with one unit of consumption good. Consumers have
consumption needs at date 1 and 2. Let q denote the amount of consumption good
needed at date 1 and 1-q denote the amount they need to consume at date 2. Each
Consumer is endowed with a storage technology which allows her to consume their
endowment at date 1 and 2. In each region there is a regional bank i . Let
},...,2,1{ nN  denote the set of the regions, we then have },...,2,1{ ni . Consumers
can choose either to invest their endowment in storage technology or lend it to their
regional bank.
There is a government in the economy that insures consumers’ deposits. We
assume the government only plays a passive role in the model. This assumption can
be justified if the economy is an evolving, complex system in which no agent can
precisely predict the state of nature due to the complex interactions between
individual agents. The government can instead only adaptively design a financial
policy which is optimal for the present state24. Let )(n denote the government’s
disutility on bailing out an individual bank, we have:
  )()( nn (1)
where  denotes the cost of bailing out an individual bank i25, )(n denotes the
government’s disutility stemming from the failure of n banks triggered by the failure
24 In this sense our model is akin to the notion of ‘self-organizing to criticality’ in complex system
where for a given financial policy (e.g. ‘environment’), in our model market discipline, individual
banks can coordinate to the critical point of systemic failure, which induce the ‘Too Systemic to Fail’
bailout.
25 The cost we have in mind is not only the fiscal costs of providing funds which induce a distorting
effect of tax increases and huge government deficits in the economy, but also the reputational cost of
the government in reneging on its ex ante commitment not to bail out individual banks.
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of bank i. This disutility can be interpreted such that the government is concerned
with the functionality of the financial system as a whole. The more banks fail the
more disruptive for the financial system26. We assume that )1(  and 0)(' n .
Let *n denote the number of failed banks such that )( *n  . The government will
bail out bank i if its failure leads to contagious failure of other 1* n banks. For
simplicity, we assume that both n and *n are even numbers, and that */ nn is divisible.
The banks have no endowment, and they only consume at date 2. Each bank has
two investment opportunities: a risk free liquid asset with return of 1 after one period,
denoting as short asset, and a risky illiquid asset which need two periods to mature,
denoting as long asset. The long asset pays a return of R at date 2 if it is successful,
where 1R . At date 1, each long asset suffers from random fluctuations of liquidity
shocks with a probability of )1(  . Each long asset either faces a liquidity deficit of
)( ix , or a liquidity surplus of )( ix , where ix denotes the amount of funds that bank
i invests in long term asset. (A liquidity surplus may arise because part of the long
asset matures early: a liquidity deficit may reflect additional investment needs from a
long asset.) We assume )( ii xx  and 0)(' ix . The realization of a liquidity shock
depends on the state of nature, there being two such states 1S and 2S occurring with
equal probability 2/)1(  . In each state, there are n/2 banks experiencing liquidity
deficit, the other half facing a liquidity surplus. These shocks do not affect solvency
of the bank as they are offset by corresponding changes in the final date payoff and do
not therefore change the overall return on the long asset. For example, if a long asset
generates a surplus (deficit) of )( ix at date 1, its date 2 return will be )( ii xRx 
26 This assumption thus reflects the argument by Mishkin (1995), Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (1998),
Freixas (1999), Rochet and Tirole (1996) and Hoggarth, Reidhill and Sinclair（2004）as we mentioned
above. In addition, the more banks failed, the more costly for the government to pay back consumers’
deposit which creates more incentive for the government to bail out the initially failed bank.
54
( )( ii xRx  ) likewise. Nevertheless interim financing of negative liquidity shocks is
essential: if a long asset faces a liquidity deficit but cannot receive the required
liquidity injection, it will fail with a return equal to zero.
A long asset could also be subject to an idiosyncratic solvency shock which is not
insurable by liquidity risk sharing. With probability , let one of the long assets suffer
a liquidity deficit denoted as )( ix at date 1, the rest of the n-1 long assets being
unaffected. Assume that, if it receives the liquidity injection of )( ix from the
government, it will generate a return of iRx in period 2; and, if not, the return is zero.
Since the increased return expected next period will be less than the current liquidity
injection, i.e. )( ii xRx  , this idiosyncratic shock involves a reduction of net worth i.e.
it is a solvency shock. The question arises is the willingness of the government to
supply funds in the face of such a shock. The central bank would normally require
good collateral which will afford it from the solvency shock. If the collateral is not
available, however, the Treasury or FDIC may be willing to act even in the
expectation of financial loss. However, liquidity injection accompanied by solvency
risk would only be provided for systemically important banks27. Each bank suffers
from such idiosyncratic shocks, with probability n/ . We assume   )1( . We
denote the set of idiosyncratic shocks as }~,...,~,~{~ 21 ni SSSS  , where iS
~
denotes the state
in which bank isuffers from the idiosyncratic shock. The detailed liquidity shocks and
idiosyncratic shocks are shown in table 1. If the bank does not suffer from either of
these two shocks, the long asset can be liquidated at date 1, with return 1r 28.
27 In recognition of the solvency risk, the Treasury could make an explicit capital injection to the
insolvent bank. For further discussion see Wickens (2012).
28 See Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Allen and Gale (1998) for a discussion of costly premature
liquidation.
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Probability State 1 2 … n/2 (n+2)/2 (n+4)/2 … n
(1-ε)/2 S1 -ω(x1) -ω(x2) -ω(xi) -ω(xn/2) +ω(x(n+2)/2) +ω(x(n+4)/2) +ω(xj) +ω(xn)
(1-ε)/2 S2 +ω(x1) +ω(xi) +ω(xn) +ω(xn/2) -ω(x(n+2)/2) -ω(x(n+4)/2) -ω(xj) -ω(xn)
ε/n 
1
~S γ (x1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ε/n
2
~S 0 γ (x2) 0 0 0 0 0 0
ε/n
3
~S 0 0 γ (x3) 0 0 0 0 0
ε/n … … … … … … … … …
ε/n
nS
~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 γ (xn)
5.2 Bank Asset Investment
If consumers lend their endowment to the regional bank, in exchange they receive a
non-state contingent debt contract that guarantees them an amount of consumable
goods at date 1 and date 2. Since consumers’ deposits are insured by the government,
each bank finds it optimal to offer q at date 1 and 1-q at date 2, in order to just meet
consumers’ reservation utility. Consumers are thus indifferent between investing their
endowment in storage technology and lending to the regional bank. Bank fails if it
cannot fulfil the contract. Each bank then has 1 unit of endowment to invest in short
and long assets. Let iy denote the amount of deposits that bank i invested in the short
asset, we then have banks’ budget constraint:
1 ii yx (2)
Bank receives a positive payoff only if it invests in a long asset, and its expected
payoff increases with ix . However, banks have to invest an amount of funds in short
asset in order to satisfy the liquidity demand at date 1. In state 1S and 2S , bank has to
Table 1: Liquidity shocks and idiosyncratic shocks at date 1.
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satisfy deposit withdraws q and face either a liquidity deficit or a surplus of )( ix
from the long asset. The liquidity demand at date 1 is thus either )( ixq  or )( ixq 
for each bank. The expected liquidity need is then q. We assume that for all
)1( qxi  we have ii yxq  )( . This assumption imposes the condition that bank
always fails at date 1 if it invests more than )1( q endowment in long term asset. The
assumption implies that the bank always finds it better off to share liquidity risk with
other banks, rather than remain in autarky. Since the banks want to economize short
assets and the average level of liquidity demand at date 1 is q , we assume that banks
can reach an individually optimal equilibrium in which every bank invests )1( q in
long asset, and invests q in liquid asset29. We then have:
]),1[(),( qqyx ii  (3)
Equation 3 implies that   )1()( qxi and   )1()( qxi .
In this case, in state 1S and 2S , although the number of early and late consumers in
each region fluctuates randomly, the aggregate demand for liquidity is constant. In
each state there are two different types of banks due to liquidity demands. In
particular, at date 1 there are n/2 banks each facing a liquidity shortage of , whereas
the other n/2 banks each facing a liquidity surplus of .
29 Alternative to the assumption we can achieve this allocation by imposing the condition that banks do
not realise the opportunity for interbank insurance until they finish allocating their endowment for short
assets and long assets. In this case, suppose there is a value of  such that bank can hedge the liquidity
shock completely by themselves, thus as long as )1(
)(2
)1( q
n
n






 , the bank’s expected payoff
under ]),1[(),( qqyx ii  will always be greater than the expected payoff under
]),1[(),(    qqyx ii . It is then optimal for a bank to choose ]),1[(),( qqyx ii  in autarky.
After the allocation, when bank realize the opportunity for interbank insurance, they find it optimal to
exchange interbank deposits with other bank(s).
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5.3 Balance Sheet Linkages
Although banks do not know their type ex ante, they have information on how the
liquidity shocks are correlated. The different liquidity shocks thus allow for interbank
insurance as banks with liquidity surpluses provide liquidity for banks with liquidity
shortages at date 1. The provision of insurance can be organized through an exchange
of interbank deposits at date 0 before the liquidity shocks are observed30. If bank i has
a higher than average liquidity demand at date 1 it can liquidate its interbank deposits
in bank(s) j. On the other hand, bank j is happy to retain the interbank deposits it holds
in bank i if bank j has enough liquidity to satisfy its own liquidity demand at date 1.
At date 2 the process is reversed, as bank j liquidates the interbank deposits in bank i
to meet its last period of deposit withdrawal.
Banks can carry out interbank insurance through two mechanisms: direct liquidity
risk sharing and indirect risk sharing. Direct liquidity risk sharing refers to interbank
insurance only with bank’s immediate neighbour, whereas indirect liquidity risk
sharing allows banks to exchange their interbank deposit with all banks in its
component through interbank intermediation. However intermediation incurs a small
transaction cost c for each intermediary, so that any bank that needs interbank
intermediation has to pay each of its intermediary c in order to compensate the cost31.
We consider these two mechanisms in the next two subsections respectively.
30 An important feature of our model is that the swap of deposits occurs ex ante, before the state of the
world is realized. This prevents cases when lenders having a monopoly of power. For instance,
Acharya et al. (2008) emphasizes the problem of ex post liquidity transfer: in an ex post market of
deposits, lenders might take advantage of their position as liquidity providers to extract profit from
banks with a shortage of liquidity. To avoid this unfavourable situation, banks prefer to close firm
contacts that set the price of liquidity ex ante. Also note that this setting mimics the model where
liquidity shock and idiosyncratic shock happens in the same state. For example bank i lend to its
neighbour bank j at date 1, bank j fails after the liquidity injection due to idiosyncratic shock, which is
unable to pay back the fund to bank i at date 2, hence triggers contagious failure.
31 For the discussion of network intermediation cost see Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007), Galeotti and
Melendez (2004) and Gilles et al (2006).
58
5.3.1 Direct Liquidity Risk Sharing
Let ijd denote the amount of deposit exchanged between bank i and j at date 0. We
consider that interbank deposit contracts are bilateral, hence jiij dd  . We denote iN as
the set of bank i’s neighbour, negiN as bank i’s set of neighbours with a negative
correlation, and negii
pos
i NNN \ as the set of i’s neighbours with a positive correlation.
We present two examples below to show how banks can insure for liquidity shocks
under different network structures.
Example 1: Bipartite network with n/2 components: n=8, 1i and ijd (see figure
1.a)
Each bank is only connected with one negatively correlated bank. They exchange
interbank deposit of with each other at date 0. Without loss any generality, we can
denote the two connected banks as Bank A and B. Suppose that Bank A experiences a
high liquidity demand and Bank B experiences a low liquidity demand at date 1, Bank
A has to pay q to the depositors and inject into the long asset. The total liquidity
demand is therefore
)( q
On the supply side, Bank A has )( q amount of its own liquid asset, amount of
liquid assets in the form of Bank B’s interbank deposits in A and claims to amount
of deposits in Bank B. We then have:
  )(qq
The liquidity demand is equal to the liquidity supply, thus the excess demand of
liquidity at date 1 is zero for Bank A.
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As for Bank B, it has to pay q to the depositors, and to Bank A. Its total liquidity
demand is also
)( q
Bank B has )( q amount of liquid assets,  amount of interbank deposits and
amount of payoff from early maturity of long assets. We then have:
  )(qq
The excess demand of liquidity at date 1 is also zero for Bank B.
At the last date, Bank A’s demand for withdraws is )1( q from its own depositors,
 from Bank B. The total payoff from long assets is  )1( qR . Since 1R , we
then have
  )1()1( qRq
Bank A can satisfy the consumers and interbank deposit withdrawals at date 2 and
receive a payoff of )1)(1( qR  .
As for Bank B we have:
  ])1([)1( qRq
where the left-hand side is the demand for consumers’ deposits and the right-hand
side is the total payoff received from long asset and interbank deposits in Bank A.
Bank B receives the same payoff as Bank A.
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Example 2: Complete connected network: n=8, 7i and 4
1
ijd (see figure 1.b)
Each bank iexchanges interbank deposit of 
4
1
with 1n banks. We then have

4
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13
4
1
4
1
4
1
 
 negi
pos
ii Nk
ik
Nh
ih
Nj
ij ggd
Consider a bank that has a high liquidity demand at date 1. It has to pay q to the
depositors, inject into the long assets, and has to pay 
4
1
to each of its neighbours
who also have high liquidity demands. On the supply side, bank i has its own liquid
asset )7
4
1(  q , and can withdraw 
4
1
from each bank and use 7
4
1
 amount of
liquid assets in the form of interbank deposits. We then have:
7
4
17
4
1)7
4
1(3
4
1
  qq
where the left-hand side is bank i’s total liquidity demand. 3
4
1
 is the amount of
interbank withdrawals by banks with a positive correlation. The right-hand side is the
supply of the liquidity. There is no excess demand for liquidity at date 1.
+(-)
+(-)
+(-)
+(-)
-(+)
-(+)
-(+)
-(+)
4/
b: Complete Network: Each bank
deposits 4/ in every bank.
+(-)
+(-)
+(-)
+(-)
-(+)
-(+)
-(+)
-(+)

a. Bipartite Network: Each bank
deposits in one negatively
correlated bank. Figure 1
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As for a bank with low liquidity demand, we have:
  3
4
17
4
1)7
4
1(4
4
13
4
1 qq
where the left-hand side is the liquidity demand, which is the sum of consumer’s
deposit withdrawal q plus the liquidity demand by three banks with a positive
correlation 3
4
1
 and the liquidity demand from four banks with negative correlations.
The right-hand side is the liquidity supply, which is the sum of bank’s own liquid
asset )7
4
1(  q , the liquid asset in the form of the other 7 banks’ interbank deposit
7
4
1
 , withdrawals of interbank deposits from the bank with positive correlation
3
4
1
 , and the return from the early maturity of long asset . There is again no
excess demand for liquidity at date 1.
At date 2, banks with high liquidity demand at date 1 face consumers’ withdrawals
of )1( q and 4
4
1
 interbank deposit withdrawals from banks with a negative
correlation at date 1. We then have:
  )1()1( qRq
The bank’s payoff at date 2 is )1)(1( qR  .
As for Banks with low liquidity demand at date 1, we have:
  ])1([)1( qRq
The bank’s payoff is also )1)(1( qR  at date 2.
5.3.2 Indirect Liquidity Risk Sharing
Banks can carry out liquidity risk sharing through interbank intermediaries. This
means that banks can exchange interbank deposits not only with their immediate
neighbours but also with their neighbour’s neighbours, and so on. Let )(gCi denote the
set of banks that belongs to the same component as bank i, and )(gC negi is the set of
banks in i’s component which have a negative correlation with bank i, we thus have
)(\)()( gCgCgC negii
pos
i  as the set of i’s neighbours with a positive correlation. At
date 0 each bank uses amount of funds as an interbank deposit.
Example 3: String n
There are four bank
interbank intermedia
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process of interbank
D deposit in Ban
using their own inte
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32 Note that banks’ type
exchanges at date 0.
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4 2)()(  gCgC negiposi (see figure 2)
ponent in which },,,{ DCBAi . Bank B and C are
nsfer interbank deposits not only for each other but
losing any generality we assume that Bank A and B
ank C and D32.
ank insurance by exchange interbank deposits. The
nge can be specified as follows. Firstly, Bank A and
condly, Bank B and C exchange 2 with each other,
plus the deposit from A and D respectively. Finally,
Bank A and D. Bank A and B, and Bank C and D
the network do not affect the amount of interbank deposit
Figure 2
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have interbank deposit exchange of and Bank B and C have interbank deposit
exchange of 2 as interbank intermediaries, see figure 2. Each bank has interbank
deposit of in its balance sheet.
Suppose Bank A and B experience high liquidity demand and Bank C and D
experiences low liquidity demand at date 1. Bank A has to pay its consumers q and
inject into the long asset. The total liquidity demand is:
q
On the supply side, Bank A has )( q amount of its own liquid asset, amount of
liquid asset in form of Bank B’s deposits and claims of amount of interbank
deposits in Bank B. The total liquidity supply for Bank A is thus:
  qq )(
Bank A can thus satisfy the liquidity demand at date 1.
As for Bank B, it has to pay q to the depositors and inject into the long asset. In
addition, it has to meet the withdrawal of the interbank deposit of by Bank A. The
liquidity demand will then be:
 q
On the supply side, Bank B has )( q amount of its own liquid asset, amount liquid
asset in form of interbank deposits and claims to 2 interbank deposits in Bank C. We
then have:
 2)( q
Bank B can satisfy the liquidity demand for Bank A and its long asset.
Bank C has to pay consumer q, and it has to transfer 2 to Bank B. Bank C’s
liquidity demand will then be:
2q
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On the supply side, Bank C has )( q amount of its own liquid asset, amount of
funds from early mature of long asset,  liquid asset in form of interbank deposits,
and claims to interbank deposits in Bank D. Its liquidity supply is:
2q
There is no excess liquidity demand for Bank C.
As for Bank D, it has to pay consumer q, and meet the interbank deposit withdrawal
from Bank C. we have:
q
Its liquidity supply consists of )( q amount of its own liquid asset, amount of
funds from early maturity of its long assets, and liquid assets in form of interbank
deposits. The sum is also:
q
The total excess liquidity demand in this network is zero at date 1.
At date 2, Bank A’s demand for withdraws is )1( q from its own consumers, 
amount of interbank deposits from Bank B, and the total payoff from long assets is
 )1( qR . Since 1R , we then have
  )1()1( qRq
Bank A can satisfy the consumers and interbank deposit withdrawals at date 2 and
receive the payoff of cqR 2)1)(1(  , where c2 is the cost of interbank
intermediation it has to pay to Bank B and C.
As for Bank B, in addition to consumers’ demand for )1( q , it also has to meet
Bank C’s interbank deposit withdrawals of 2 . The total payoff from the long asset is
 )1( qR . Bank B can liquidate the interbank deposit of from Bank A. We then
have:
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  )1(2)1( qRq
Bank B’s payoff is cqR  )1)(1( , where c is the intermediation cost Bank B has to
pay to Bank C.
Bank C also has demand of )1( q from its consumers. In addition it has to return
amount of interbank deposits to Bank D. The total payoff is  )1( qR from long
assets and claims of 2 from Bank B. We then have:
 2)1()1(  qRq
Bank C’s payoff is also cqR  )1)(1( , where c is the intermediation cost Bank C
has to pay to Bank B.
Bank D also faces )1( q withdrawals from its consumers. The total payoff is
 )1( qR , from long asset and claims of from Bank C. We then have:
  ])1([)1( qRq
where the left-hand side is the demand for withdrawals and the right-hand side is the
total payoff received from the long asset and interbank deposit in Bank A. Bank D’s
payoff is cqR 2)1)(1(  , since it has to pay c to Bank C and Bank B for
intermediation service.
5.4 Contagious Failure
In the previous section we have shown that liquidity shocks in states 1S and 2S create
incentives for banks to form connections by exchanging interbank deposits at date 0.
However, interbank deposit exchange works well only if there is no excess demand
for liquidity in the financial system as a whole. If there are non-insurable idiosyncratic
shock in states nSS
~,...,~1 , the cross holdings of interbank deposits can cause problems
of contagion. That is, the shock may affect initially only one institution and then
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spread to other bank(s) through interbank deposit exchange. In order to evaluate the
contagion risk we introduce the concept of loss given default (LDG) which is the loss
of value a bank incurs on its interbank deposits when its counterpart fails at date 1.
We illustrate the process of contagious failure using examples 1 and 3.
In example 1, Bank A connects with Bank B and the amount of interbank deposit
exchange is . Suppose that Bank A suffers from idiosyncratic shock at date 1, it then
faces an excessive liquidity demand of . Bank A’s liquidity demand is thus )( q ,
whereas other banks face a liquidity demand of q only. Bank A has liquid asset which
is worth )( q , and it can use amount of liquid assets in the form of Bank B’s
claims and liquidate amount of its interbank claims on Bank B. However, since
Bank B also has the liquidity need of q, it needs to liquidate the interbank deposit
from Bank A33. We then have:
  qq )(
where the right-hand side is Bank A’s liquidity demand, which is less than the
liquidity supply in the left-hand side. Bank A cannot meet the liquidity need and the
long asset fails. Given that interbank deposits are subordinated debt relative to
consumers’ deposits, Bank A has to satisfy consumers’ deposit withdraw of )1( q
before meeting the interbank deposit withdrawal. Since  )1( q , Bank B then
suffers from a loss given default of . To meet the liquidity deficit, Bank B has to
liquidate an amount of the long asset that equals . Liquidating the illiquid asset
prematurely, however, incurs the penalty rate 1r . The maximum amount of a long
33 Note that bank finds it optimal to liquidate the interbank deposits before liquidating the long asset,
because the return of interbank deposit is one at date 1 and 2, whereas the return of long asset is r at
date 1 and R at date 2. Since rR  ; the pecking order of asset liquidation is liquidating short asset first,
liquidating interbank deposit second and liquidating long asset last, see also Allen and Gale (2000).
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asset that can be liquidated without causing bankruptcy is that Bank B has to meet
consumers’ deposit withdrawals )1( q at date 2. We then have:



 

R
qRrCB )1)(1( (4)
where CB denotes Banks’ capital buffer which depends on the rate of early liquidation
of long asset r , the amount of consumer’s deposit withdraw at date 2 and the return of
a long asset at date 2. If the capital buffer is less than the loss given default, i.e.
CB , Bank B fails due to contagion. In general, bank i suffers from contagious
failure as long as
iLGDCB  (5)
With regard to example 3, if Bank A suffers from idiosyncratic shock at date 1, by
the same argument, Bank A cannot meet the liquidity need and the long asset fails.
Bank B then suffers from a loss given default of . Hence, to meet its liquidity deficit,
Bank B has to liquidate its interbank deposit 2 from Bank C. However, Bank C also
needs to liquidate the interbank deposit of 2 from Bank B. We then have:
 22)(  qq
where the left-hand side is Bank B’s liquidity supply and the right-hand side its
liquidity demand. Bank B faces an excess liquidity demand of . Again, since the
capital buffer is less than the loss given default, Bank B fails. It has to liquidate all its
long assets at date 1. Bank B’s liquidity supply consist of early liquidation of its long
assets at date 1 )1( qr  , short assets )( q , and interbank deposits, 2 , from Bank C .
Its liquidity demand is 1 from consumer deposit withdrawal and 2 from Bank C’s
interbank deposit withdraw. If r is small, we then have:
1)()1(  qqr (6)
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Under this condition, Bank C suffers from a loss given default of 2 . Bank C’s
liquidity supply is the sum of own short asset )( q , interbank deposit , and its
interbank deposit in Bank D, subtracting the loss given default 2 .
 2)( q
The total liquidity supply for Bank C is then )( q , which consists of its liquidity
demand q from consumers’ deposits withdraw and from Bank D’s interbank deposit
withdraw. Bank C has to liquidate an amount of long asset equal to 2 . Since CB ,
Bank C then fails. Its total liquidity supply is then
)()1(  qqr
which is less than 1 given condition 6. Bank D thus suffers from a loss given default
of , which also fails given that the same argument as described above applies.
6. Network and Interbank Deposit Guarantee
We first consider the network formation game where interbank deposits are
guaranteed by the government. This implies that the failure of an individual bank’s
neighbour does not impose any contagious failure on itself. Hence the loss given
default is equal to zero. In other words, equilibrium network is independent of
idiosyncratic shock in state iS
~
. The network formation incentive for each individual
bank is only to share the liquidity risk. Since interbank intermediation incurs costs for
banks that need the service, it is intuitive that no bank is willing to pay intermediation
cost if there is opportunity of direct risk sharing. We show in the appendices that it is
always optimal to have direct risk sharing if there is interbank deposit guarantee.
Under direct liquidity risk sharing, banks can form a bilateral link with each other by
exchanging interbank deposit at date 0. The total amount of deposits that i exchanged
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with its neighbours should balance out its liquidity shortage or excess. In other word,
bank i has to ensure that there are always at least amount of interbank deposit
retained in its balance sheet if it faces a liquidity deficit at date 1.
Since interbank insurance against liquidity shocks is provided only through links
with banks of a different type, sufficient condition for complete liquidity risk sharing
should satisfy:

 negiNj
ijd (7)
Let }1,0{}{   negiNj ijd
I

denote the indicator function specifying whether bank i has
interbank deposit exchange satisfying condition (7). The indicator function is equal to
1 if condition (7) is satisfied and 0 otherwise. The individual bank’s expected payoff
function can be written as:
)1)(1()1(])1)(1(
2
1)1)(1(
2
1)[1()( }{ qRn
nIqRqRgu
neg
iNj
ijdi










(8)
where the first term is the bank’s expected return in state 1S and 2S . The first term in
the square bracket is bank i’s expected payoff if it has a liquidity surplus and the
second term is its expected payoff if it has a liquidity deficit. The liquidity deficit can
be satisfied only if there are at least amount of interbank deposits can be retained in
bank i, as in the examples we presented above. The second term is the expected
payoff in the state of idiosyncratic shock iS
~
. Since there is interbank deposit
guarantee, the banks are safe from their neighbour’s failure. Also, because of )1(  ,
there will be no bailout on individual banks. Bank i thus suffers from idiosyncratic
shock with probability
n

. We can show that:
Proposition 1: Under interbank deposit insurance with positive intermediation costs,
the bilateral equilibrium networks do not have interbank intermediaries. The bilateral
equilibrium networks satisfy 
 negiNj
ijd and include symmetric structure. The only
strictly bilateral equilibrium network is bipartite network with 2/n components.
Proof: see Appendices
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e intuition is the following. In state 1S and 2S the aggregate liquidity demand is
to the aggregate liquidity supply. In any network, if there is one bank that has
ij , there must be another bank that is negatively correlated with this bank
as 
 negiNj
ijd . This then violates the definition of bilateral equilibrium because
two banks can coordinate to drop all their links and form a link with each other
gives higher expected payoff. Since the bank’s link with positive correlated
has no effect on liquidity risk sharing, banks are indifferent when connecting
these banks. We then have that symmetric network with 
 negiNj
ijd satisfies
negatively correlated bank.
Figure 3
negatively correlated banks.
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bilateral equilibrium, such as the complete network in Figure 1.b. The other regular
network structures, as shown in Figure 1.a and Figure 3, are also bilateral equilibrium
networks. The bipartite network with 2/n components, as in Figure 1.a, is the only
strictly bilateral equilibrium network, because in any other bilateral equilibrium
network any two banks with negative correlation can coordinate to delete all their
links and form a link with each other which gives them the same expected payoffs.
7. Network, Market Discipline, and Bailout
In this section, we examine the equilibrium network under market discipline where
interbank deposit guarantee is removed. As a result, the non insurable idiosyncratic
shocks bear the risk of contagion, as we shown in section 5.4. However, the
government suffers from the ‘Too Systemic to Fail’ bailout. Individual banks know
their interbank deposit will be implicitly guaranteed if the bank that suffers from
idiosyncratic shock can receive a bailout. The TSTF bailout is determined by two
factors. Firstly, as we have shown in section 5.4, it depends on the value of capital
buffer and the amount of loss given default. The contagious failure happens as long as
condition 5 is satisfied, which implies that the contagious failure increases with
amount of interbank deposit exchange. In this chapter we impose the condition
CB . Secondly, the TSTF bailout depends on government’s disutility for bailing
out individual banks, which is the function of number of failed banks induced by
contagion, as shown in equation 1. Individual banks take account of the government’s
ex post incentive problem when forming a liquidity risk sharing network. In order to
be able to write an individual bank’s payoff function explicitly, we assume34:
1)2()1( *  nqqr (9)
34 This assumption is in line with condition 6. Note that this assumption is not crucial for our general
results. We will discuss this assumption in the next section.
72
We show how the network with interbank intermediaries can be induced by market
discipline and a TSTF bailout. Let }1,0{
})({

 negi
pos
i CigC
I denote the indicator function
which is equal to 1 if the number of banks in bank i’s component with positive
correlation is the same as the number of banks with negative correlation, and 0
otherwise35, }{ *nCiI  denote the indicator function which is 1 if the number of banks in
bank i’s component is no less than *n , and 0 otherwise, and }{ *nCiI  denotes the
indicator function which is 0 if the number of banks in bank i’s component is no less
than *n , and 1 otherwise. Finally we denote ))(,( gCjie i as the number of bank i’s
interbank intermediaries. We can then express the individual bank’s expected payoff
under interbank intermediation as:
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where the first term in equation 10 is the bank’s expected payoff in state 1S and 2S .
The first term in the first square bracket is the expected payoff if the bank has a
liquidity surplus at date 1, and the second term is the expected payoff if the bank is in
liquidity deficit. The value depends on the number of negatively and positively
correlated banks in the component. The second term in equation 10 refers to the
expected payoff for banks in the state of idiosyncratic shock iS
~
. If the number of
banks in i’s component is less than *n , the government will not initiate the bailout.
35 This indicator function rules out the possibility that there is unequal number of banks with different
types in equilibrium. This is quite intuitive because since there is no aggregate liquidity shock in state
1S and 2S , and also since   )1( , if there is one component with unequal number of banks of
different types, it must be true that there is another component which also has unequal number of banks
of different types. This means that any two banks that are negatively correlated in these two
components respectively can both reach better expected payoffs by deleting all their links and form a
link with each other. The detailed discussion is in the appendices.
(10)
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Given CB and condition 9, all banks in the component will fail, if any one of them
goes bankrupt. The probability of bank i’s contagious failure is thus
n
gCi )( . If the
number of banks in i’s component is no less than *n , then the failure of any one of the
banks in the component will trigger the bailout. For }{ *nCiI  , the bank’s payoff in state
iS
~
will then be )1)(1( qR  . The last term represents the amount bank i has to pay to
its intermediaries. We can show that:
Proposition 2: under market discipline and TSTF bailout, given CB and
condition 9, if )1)(1(20 qR
n
c  , the strictly bilateral equilibrium network with
interbank intermediaries exhibits core-periphery structure.
Proof: see Appendix
The intuition is as follows. If the network consists of several components it must be
true that in each component there are equal number of negatively and positively
correlated banks. This is intuitive given equation 10 and   )1( , because,
otherwise, there are always two negatively correlated banks, each belonging to
different components with both having unequal amount of banks with different types,
finding optimal to delete all their links and reach a higher expected payoff by forming
a link with each other.
Next, we show that in a component with interbank intermediaries the number of
banks must be at least *n . Otherwise the probability of contagious failure is greater
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than the bank only has one connection with its negatively correlated bank, which only
has probability of
n
1
 of contagious failure.
We then show that in each component with interbank intermediaries it must be
minimally connected because, intuitively, if there are more than two shortest paths,
the total interbank deposit exchange is divided among the paths. If condition 5
satisfies   CB where is infinitely small, then the failure of its neighbour
does not necessarily impose failure to the bank hence does not trigger the bailout.
Banks have incentive to avoid having more than two paths. A more careful proof on
this argument regarding to saving the cost of interbank intermediation is discussed in
the appendices.
Finally we can show that the strictly bilateral equilibrium network exhibits core
periphery structure because any periphery bank has incentive to disconnect its
neighbour bank(s) and connect with other intermediary which has high centrality.
This is because the deviation can increase the number of periphery nodes which by
definition decreases number of intermediaries, thus deceases the cost of
intermediation for each bank. We then have agglomeration effect which generates
core periphery structure. In equilibrium, the peripheral banks’ the expected payoffs
equal to
cqR  )1)(1( (11)
The core banks’ expected payoff is then:
)1)(1( qR  (12)
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8. Discussion
8.1 Robustness of the Model
This section demonstrates that condition 9 is not a necessary condition to derive our
result. Suppose condition 9 is violated, that is 1)2()1( *  nqqr and capital
buffer satisfies   CB , where is infinitely small. We can show that the
string network for each component having *n number of banks can also trigger the
bailout, as long as condition 6 is satisfied, that is 1)1(  qqr . Suppose that
6* n , a string network with 6 banks is illustrated in figure 4. The process of
interbank deposit exchange at date 0 is the same as in example 3, and the amount of
interbank exchange is specified in figure 4.
Without loss of any generality, we assume that Bank A suffers from idiosyncratic
shock and failure36. Bank B then suffers from a loss given default of . Bank B fails
with a total liquidity supply equal to  2)()1(  qqr , where 2 is Bank B’s
interbank deposit withdraw from Bank C. Given condition 6, Bank C thus suffers
from loss given default of 2 , and by the same argument Bank C fails with a total
liquidity supply equal to  3)()1(  qqr , which again satisfies condition 6.
Bank D thus suffers from a loss given default of 3 . By the same argument Bank E
fails and so does Bank F. This then triggers the bailout of Bank A.
36 Note that the failure of any bank in the string network can trigger the same effect.
 3 2 2
A CB D E F
Figure 4
In the next example we show that a core-periphery structure can still be an
equilibrium, even if 1)2()1( *  nqqr .
Example 4: Supposing we have 12* n and 15)1(  qqr , we can show that a
core-periphery network with 12 banks can trigger the bailout.
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8.2 Circuit Breaker and Network Formation
Our result of core-periphery structure as strictly bilateral equilibrium relies on two
assumptions: first, the government’s time-inconsistency on bailing out systemically
important bank, second, banks have the incentive to avoid high interbank
intermediation costs which they have to pay in order to compensate for the cost of
deposit transfer by their intermediaries. This then induces an agglomeration effect on
generating core-periphery structure. In this section we show that the core-periphery
structure can still be a strict equilibrium, even if the cost of interbank intermediation
has to be paid for by intermediaries themselves.
A smart government would implement a bailout policy as a circuit breaker so that it
only bail out those banks who are about to fail due to contagion, as argued by Rochet
and Tirole (1996). In other words, the government only bails out banks who suffer
from contagious failure rather than direct idiosyncratic shocks37. By doing so, the
government on the one hand prevents the systemic risk, and on the other hand could
decrease the bank’s incentive for risk shifting because there is positive probability of
failure. Considering the string network in figure 2, if Bank A fails, the government
bails out Bank B instead. However, as argued by Rochet and Tirole (1996) the use of
bailout as circuit breaker suffers from transaction costs. They point out that, to operate
the rescue, the government must have a clear picture of mutual positions, priority
rules in bankruptcy and solvent banks’ needing cash infusions. The government must
exercise difficult judgements on each bank over a short time span in order to operate
this selective rescue properly. If these costs increase with number of banks they are
dealing with, it is less costly to rescue the bank which triggered the systemic risk
instead. In this situation, in the core periphery network, a core bank always gets the
37 Note that the circuit breaker bailout is not the same as interbank deposit guarantee since the former
is conditional on systemic risk, hence network structure.
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bailout if the transaction cost of bailing out all periphery banks is greater than the cost
of rescuing the core bank. Each periphery bank is likely to fail due to idiosyncratic
shock, with a probability of
n
1
 . The core periphery structure is strictly bilateral
equilibrium in a size *n component with equal number of different type of banks, if the
cost of intermediation for the core banks is no more than the benefit it gets from the
bailout, that is )1)(1(
)1(
2
* qRnn
c 

 , and it is strictly beneficial for peripheral
banks not to deviate from core-periphery structure. In this case the payoff for core
bank is
cnqR )1()1)(1( *  (13)
And the expected payoffs for periphery banks are:
)1)(1()1()1)(1)(1( qR
n
nqR   (14)
8.3 Market Discipline and Risk-Shifting Problems
The government’s desire to encourage market discipline is because market discipline
is deemed to be an incentive scheme in which investors in subordinated debt can take
account of the probability of contagious failure hence be able to limit the greater risk
taking behaviour of the borrowers. However, effectiveness of market discipline
depends on the extent of the government’s bailout. We showed that given
time-inconsistency problem banks can coordinate to a network structure with more
number of banks in the component and more susceptible to systemic risk.
Although we do not model banks’ individual risk-shifting problem explicitly, we
can still see that the withdraw of interbank deposit guarantee and the present of TSTF
bailout leads to even greater risk-shifting incentive since the banks’ expected payoff is
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independent of the idiosyncratic shock and contagious failure as shown in equation 11
and 12. Also if individual bank’s expected payoff is increasing with level of the
risk-shifting, then equation 13 is easier to hold since the core bank can always
compensate the cost of intermediation by investing in risky asset than periphery banks,
which makes the financial system even more fragile.
9. Conclusion
This chapter examines how financial regulation based on individual banks can affect
the interconnectedness of financial network and the systemic risk using network
formation game approach. We suggest that any regulation targets only on individual
banks or takes financial network structure as given could ignore the effect of this very
regulation on the strategic interactions between banks which could end up with a new
equilibrium network structure which make the ex ante regulatory policy ineffective.
The chapter thus implies that the financial authorities, such as FDICIA, needs to
prompt corrective action on monitoring systemic risk rather than only focus on
individual risk. After all, it is the functionality of financial system as a whole that
really matters. Key policy issue facing FDICIA today is the need for systemic
regulation on regulating individual banks’ interacting behaviour.
Our analysis supports the recent proposal by the Independent Commission for
Banking chaired by Sir John Vickers (see ICB, 2011). The ICB’s financial report
introduces the idea of “ring fencing” banks that supply essential commercial banking
services. By limiting their investment banking activities, this is equivalent to breaking
up or disentangling the highly interconnected financial network. Ring fencing, as
Miller and Zhang (2012) suggest, is similar to imposing ex ante circuit-breakers, thus
limiting the spread of systemic risks ex post. In this chapter a “ring fence” would
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separate the large financial network component into several small ones, thus
decreasing the systemic importance of individual banks. By lowering the incentive for
systemic bailout, it can help restore market discipline.
Haldane and May’s (2011) suggest that regulatory capital and/or liquidity ratios
should be designed so as to limit the potential for network spillovers. They
recommend that high ratios being imposed on banks deemed systemically important.
Our model implies that such systemic regulation can have two possible effects. First,
if a systemically important bank chooses to hold higher ratio of capital or liquid assets,
it is less likely to trigger the contagious failure. Second, if high cost of capital or low
return on liquid assets make it unattractive to be systemically important, the regulation
can induce banks to break up the highly interconnected network, yielding a bipartite
network with many components, which as we have shown in section 6, will decrease
the number banks suffering from contagious failure.
81
References
Acharya, V. V. and Yorulmazer, T. (2007), “Too many to fail – An analysis of time
inconsistency in bank closure policies”, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 16(1),
1–31.
Allen, Franklin, and Douglas Gale, (2000), "Financial contagion", Journal of
Political Economy 108(1).
Alentorn, A., E. Nier, J. Yang and T. Yorulmazer (2007), “Network Models and
Financial Stability”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
Aumann, R. and R. Myerson (1988): Endogenus formation of links between players
and coalitions: an application to the Shapley Value, in The Shapley Value, A. Roth
(ed.), 175-91, Cambridge University Press.
Babus, Ana, (2009), "The formation of financial networks", Discussion Paper 06-093,
Tinbergen Institute.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, (2003). The New Basel Capital Accord.
Consultative document. Bank for International Settlements.
Beck, T., A. Demirguc-Kunt, and R. Levine, (2004). "Bank Concentration and
Crises," World Bank, Mimeo.
Bech, Morten, and Enghin Atalay, (2010) .The Topology of the Federal Funds
Market., Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, forthcoming.
Benston, George, and George Kaufman. (1998) “Deposit Insurance Reform in the
FDIC Improvement Act: The Experience to Date.” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Economic Perspectives (Second Quarter), 2–20.
Bhattacharya, S. and D. Gale (1987), “Preference Shocks, Liquidity and Central
Bank Policy”. In New Approaches to Monetary Economics.
Boss, Michael, Helmut Elsinger, Martin Summer and Stefan Thurner (2004),
"Network topology of the interbank market", Quantitative Finance 4.
Castiglionesi, F., and N. Navarro (2007): “Optimal Fragile Financial Networks,”
working paper, Tilburg University.
Cifuentes, R., G. Ferruchi, and H.S. Shin (2005): “Liquidity Risk and Contagion,”
Journal of European Economic Association,” 3(2-3), 556-566.
Craig, B and Peter, G (2010), “Interbank Tiering and Money Centre Banks” , BIS
Working Papers, No 322
Cocco, Joao, Francisco Gomes, and Nuno Martins, 2009, "Lending relationships in
the interbank market", Journal of Financial Intermediation 18.
82
Degryse, H., and G. Nguyen (2007): “Interbank Exposures: An Empirical
Examination of Systemic Risk in the Belgian Banking System,” International Journal
of Central Banking, forthcoming.
Diamond, Douglas, (1984), "Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring",
Review of Economic Studies 51(3).
Diamond, Douglas, and Philip Dybvig, (1983), "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and
liquidity", Journal of Political Economy 91(3).
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). (1998) Managing the Crisis—The
FDIC and RTC Experience 1980–1994, Vol. 1. Washington, DC: FDIC.
Flannery, Mark J., and Stanislava Nikolova. (2004). "Market Discipline of U.S.
Financial Firms: Recent Evidence and Research Issues." Cambridge: MIT Press,
87-100.
Freixas, Xavier, Bruno Parigi, and Jean-Charles Rochet, (2000), "Systemic risk,
interbank relations, and liquidity provision by the central bank", Journal of Money,
Credit, and Banking 32(3)
Furfine, Craig H. (2001) “Banks as Monitors of Other Banks: Evidence from the
Overnight Market for Federal Funds.” Journal of Business, 74, 33–57.
Furfine, C. H. (2003), “Interbank Exposures: Quantifying the Risk of Contagion”,
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
Gai, P and S. Kapadia (2010) “Contagion in Financial Networks”, Proceedings of
the Royal Society A, vol. 466, no. 2120, pp. 2401–2423.
Gai, P., A. Haldane and S. Kapadia (2010) “Complexity, Concentration and
Contagion – Outline”, paper presented at the EEA Conference, Glasgow, August.
Goyal, Sanjeev, (2007). Connections .an Introduction to the Economics of Networks
(Princeton University Press).
Goyal, Sanjeev, and Fernando Vega-Redondo, (2007), "Structural holes in social
networks", Journal of Economic Theory 137.
Greenspan, A. (2001), “Cyclicality and Banking Regulation,” Remarks at the
Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
Haldane, A. G. and R. M. May (2011) “Systemic Risk in Banking Ecosystems”,
Nature, 469, 20 January, pp. 351–355.
Hoggarth, G., Reidhill, J. and Sinclair, P. (2004), “On the Resolution of Banking
Crises: Theory and Evidence”, Working Paper no. 229, Bank of England.
ICB (Independent Commission on Banking) (2011) “Final Report” (London: ICB).
83
Jacklin, C and S Bhattacharya (1988): “Distinguishing panics and
information-based bank runs: welfare and policy implications”, Journal of Political
Economy 96, 568-92.
Jackson, M., and A. Wolinsky (1996): “A Strategic Model of Social and Economic
Networks,” Journal of Economic Theory, 71, 44-74.
Jackson, Matthew, (2008). Social and Economic Networks (Princeton University
Press).
Kane, Edward J. (1989). The S&L Insurance Mess: How Did It Happen?
Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press.
Kashyap A K, Rajan R G. and Stein J C. (2008) “Rethinking Capital Regulation”
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City symposium on “Maintaining Stability in a
Changing Financial System”,
King T, B.(2008), “Discipline and Liquidity in the Interbank Market”Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking.
Lagunoff, R., and L. Schreft (2001): “A Model of Financial Fragility,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 99, 220-264.
Leitner, Yaron, (2005), "Financial networks: contagion, commitment, and private
sector bailouts", Journal of Finance 60(6).
Miller, M., and Zhang, L (2012), “Whither Capitalism? Financial Externalities and
Crisis” mimeo, IEA World Congress
Mishkin, Frederic S. (2006). The Next Great Globalization: How Disadvantaged
Nations Can Harness Their Financial Systems to Get Rich. Princeton: Princeton
University Press
Mishkin, Frederic S. (1995). "Understanding Financial Crises: A Developing
Country Perspective." In Annual World Bank Conference on Development
Economics 1996, ed. Michael Bruno and Boris Pleskovic. Washington, D.C.: World
Bank, 29-62.
Michele Manna & Carmela Iazzetta, (2009). "The topology of the interbank market:
developments in Italy since 1990," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers)
711, Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department.
Mistrulli, Paolo, (2007), "Assessing Financial Contagion in the Interbank Market:
Maximum Entropy Versus Observed Interbank Lending Patterns", Bank of Italy Temi
di Discussione 641.
Myerson, R. B. (1977), “Graphs and Cooperation in Games”. Mathematics of
Operations Research, 2: 225-229.
84
Nier, E and Baumann, U. (2006) “Market discipline, disclosure and moral hazard in
banking”, Journal of Financial Intermediation 15
Rochet, J. C. and J. Tirole (1996), “Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk”, Journal
of Money Credit and Banking.
Stigum, Marcia and Anthony Crescenzi, (2007). Stigum.s Money Market, 4th
edition (McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., New York).
Sironi, A., (2003). Testing for market discipline in the European banking industry:
Evidence from subordinated debt issues. J. Money, Credit, Banking 35 (3), 443–472.
Sanjeev Goyal & Sumit Joshi, (2006) "Bilateralism and Free Trade," International
Economic Review,
Stem, Gary H., and Ron J. Feldman. 2004. Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank
Bailouts. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Torre, Augusto de la and Ize, Alain, (2009), “Regulatory Reform: Integrating
Paradigms”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4842.
Upper, Christian, and AndreasWorms, (2004), "Estimating bilateral exposures in
the German interbank market: is there a danger of contagion?", European Economic
Review 48(4).
Wickens, M. (2012), “What Saved the Banks: Unconventional Monetary or Fiscal
Policy” in J, Chadha and S, Holly Interest Rates, Prices and Liquidity. Cambridge UK:
Cambridge University Press.
85
Appendices
Proposition 1: Under interbank deposit insurance with positive intermediation costs,
the bilateral equilibrium networks do not have interbank intermediaries. The bilateral
equilibrium networks satisfy 
 negiNj
ijd and include symmetric structure. The only
strictly bilateral equilibrium network is bipartite network with 2/n components.
Proof: In order to make the proof tractable, we impose the condition on the amount of
interbank deposit exchange between two banks. The amount of deposit exchange
between two negatively correlated banks is determined by the bank that has the most
number of links of negatively correlated banks. We then have:
1,,},min{  ij
Negpos
neg
j
neg
i
ij gNjNid




(A.1)
where negi denotes the number of i’s neighbours with negative correlation,
posN
denotes the set of banks with liquidity deficits (surpluses) and negN denotes the number
of banks with liquidity surpluses (deficits). We then have 2/nNN posneg  .
We can first show that bipartite network with 2/n components is a bilateral
equilibrium network as in figure 1.a with 
 negiNj
ijd . Each bank’s expected payoff in
this network is thus:
)1)(1()1()]1)(1)[(1()( qR
n
nqRgui 



 (A.2)
By the definition of strictly bilateral equilibrium no pair of banks can coordination to
reach higher or equivalent expected payoffs by deviating from this network structure.
We then show that bilateral equilibrium network must satisfy 
 negiNj
ijd . The
proof is based on the argument that there is no aggregate liquidity demand and supply
86
in state 1S and 2S . Suppose there is a bank i which has 
 negiNj
ijd , then under
condition A.1 there must be at least one bank, say bank j, which is negatively
correlated with bank i also has 
 negiNj
ijd . By the definition of bilateral equilibrium,
banks i and j can coordinate with each other to reach the payoff of A.2, which is better
for both banks, either by forming a link with each other, if ijgg  implies 
 negiNj
ijd
and 
 negjNk
jkd , the additional link gives higher expected payoff for both i and j, or
deleting all their links and forming a link with each other which can both have

 negiNj
ijd and reaches the payoff in A.2.
Since there is no aggregate shock in state 1S and 2S , if there is one bank with

 negiNj
ijd , it must be true that there are two other banks with 
 negiNj
ijd which are
negatively correlated. By the same argument above, this is not a bilateral equilibrium
network. The equilibrium network has to be 
 negiNj
ijd .
Links between two banks with positive correlations do not have an effect on
liquidity risk sharing, so that banks are indifferent in forming a link with positively
correlated banks. We then have that any symmetric network that satisfies condition

 negiNj
ijd is a bilateral equilibrium network. In any bilateral equilibrium network,
any two banks with negative correlations can delete all their other links and form a
link with each other. This is a payoff equivalent to the original equilibrium network
with some structural changes applied. By the definition of a strictly bilateral
equilibrium, the only network that satisfies the criteria is the bipartite network with
2/n components.
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With regard to network with interbank intermediaries, by the definition of
intermediation it must be true that there are two negatively correlated banks, say i and
j, that are path connected. Each bank has to pay a cost of at least c to compensate the
intermediary. These two banks can reach the payoff of A.2, by deleting all their links
and forming a link with each other, which violate the definition of bilateral
equilibrium.
Proposition 2: under market discipline and TSTF bailout, given CB and
condition 9, if )1)(1(20 qR
n
c  , then the strictly bilateral equilibrium network
with interbank intermediaries exhibits core-periphery structure.
Proof: first we show that in equilibrium network, each component contains an equal
number of negatively and positively correlated banks. Contrary to what was asserted,
suppose there is one component, denoting A, with unequal number of different types
of banks, without any loss of generality, we assume posA
neg
A CC  . Since on aggregate
there is no excess demand for liquidity, it must be true that there is another component,
say B, which has posBnegB CC  . It must be true that in component A and B there are two
banks i and j that are negatively correlated which have the maximum expected payoffs
of:
)1)(1()1)(1(
2
1)1( qRqR   (A.3)
However, if they could delete all their links and form a link with each other, then their
minimum payoffs are equal to:
)1)(1(2)1)(1)(1( qR
n
nqR   (A.4)
88
Therefore, for
4

n
n
 , the argument holds.
Next, we show that in a component with interbank intermediaries, the number of
banks must be at least *n . The proof above implies that the number of banks in a
component must be even. If we suppose there is one component containing interbank
intermediaries with 2* n number of banks, then the bank’s maximum payoff for this
component is:
)1)(1()2()1)(1)(1(
*
qR
n
nnqR   (A.5)
By the definition of interbank intermediary, we must have 42* n . The proof above
argues that there must be an equal number of banks with different types, and then
implies that in the component any two banks with negative correlations can delete all
their links to connect with each other. The expected payoffs for these two banks are
given by A.4, which is better than A.5.
Next we show that any component with interbank intermediation has to be
minimally connected. There are two ways to prove this argument. The first one is
intuitive, and is based on condition 5. It is natural to impose the condition that
interbank intermediation can only take place on the shortest path, if there are more
than two short paths, and the interbank deposit exchange is divided among the
shortest paths. Suppose condition 5 satisfies   CB where is infinitely small,
then the failure of its neighbour does not necessarily impose failure on the bank,
hence does not trigger the bailout. If there are two shortest paths connecting
negatively correlated bank i and j. either of these Banks have an incentive unilaterally
break one path. Alternatively, since it does not trigger the bailout, they can coordinate
to delete all their links and reach better payoff of A.4 by forming a link with each
other.
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The second proof relies on the definition of interbank intermediaries. Let
))(;,( gCjiE i denotes the set of banks connecting bank i and j in the shortest path(s),
then bank i’s total interbank intermediaries can be expressed as:

iNj
ii gCjiEgCjie
\
))(;,())(,(

 (A.6)
We can first consider the cycle with an even number of banks. Let bank i and bank
j denote two banks who are the furthest away from each other. Let i denotes the set
of banks which belong to the cycle, there are then
2
2i number of bank on each side
of bank i. There are two shortest path connecting i and j. According to A.6, The total
interbank intermediaries for bank i are 2i . Bank i and j, can strictly increase their
payoff if they can coordinate with each other, by deleting only one link and forming a
link with each other. This deviation can increase the number of periphery nodes which
by definition decrease the number of intermediaries, thus decreasing the cost of
intermediation for each bank. The marginal payoff for bank i and j is at least c. (see
Figure 6 below).
A similar argument for a cycle with odd numbers can also be constructed. Suppose the
component contains a cycle with m number of banks, where m is an odd number and
where 5m , since for m to be equal to 3, there are no interbank intermediaries in the
cycle. If bank i belongs to the cycle, then it must be true that there are 3m banks
i
j
i
j
Figure 6
intermediating for bank i. Bank i can coordinate with one of the banks which is the
furthest distance away to i, say Bank j, to each delete one link and link up with each
other. The marginal payoff for bank i is then zero, and c for bank j which again
violates the concept of bilateral equilibrium. See figure 7 for an example.
The minimally connected component implies equation A.6
2()())(,( 1   iNjii INgCgCjie j 

where 1
j
NjN
 is number of banks with only one link,
function which is equal to one if i has at least 2 links. I
component, there must be at least two periphery banks
contains the maximum number of interbank intermediar
either side of a string which does not intermediate. Let ban
and bank k denote bank i’s neighbour bank. Bank i can de
link with bank j, where ij Nj 2 . This deviation
payoff of c, since under the new structure the total num
increases to 11 jjN
 . Bank j is also willing to link with
for bank j is also c, see Figure 8. The repetition of the p
effect which generates the core periphery structure.
i
Figure 7
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can be written as:
) (A.7)
and )2( iI  is an indicator
n any minimally connected
, because a string network
ies with only two banks on
k i denote a periphery bank,
lete the link with bank k and
can give bank i marginal
ber of banks with one link
i, since the marginal payoff
rocess is the agglomeration
i
j
ij
j
i
k
Figure 8k91
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Chapter 3
Capital Requirement, “Too Many to Fail” and Systemic
Risk
Summary
This chapter argues that market price sensitive capital regulation combined with the
government’s bailout policy can induce banks to herd by investing in highly
correlated assets. We follow Acharya and Yorulmazer’s (2007) study of the “too
many to fail” problem in a two-bank model. They argue that in order to reduce social
losses due to the systemic risk of banks failing together, the financial regulator finds it
ex post optimal to bail out every troubled bank, because the acquisition of liquidated
assets by other investors result in a high misallocation cost. In contrast to their paper,
we argue that as long as it is profitable for banks to purchase the liquidated assets at
the cash-in-the-market price, in the state of systemic failure, the regulator can always
commit to randomly bailing out only just one bank and letting the bailed out bank
purchase the failed bank’s assets– there is no “too many to fail” bailout. We then
show that market price sensitive capital regulation can remove banks’ incentive to
purchase liquidated assets at the cash-in-the-market price, if the cost of banking
capital is high. Therefore, in the state of systemic failure, the regulator has to bail out
every troubled bank. A “too many to fail” rescue arises. Thus, the market price
sensitive capital can induce highly correlated banking assets.
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1. Introduction
This chapter studies the joint effect of the official bailout policy and market-price
sensitive capital regulation on a bank’s strategic choice of investment correlation and
the resulting systemic risk. We argue that this joint effect could give rise to the “too
many to fail” problem38 for the financial regulator.39 This can increase banks’
incentive to herd by investing in highly correlated assets ex ante, and accentuate the
problem of systemic risk ex post.
The chapter follows Acharya and Yorulmazer’s (2007) study of financial regulators’
“too many to fail” problem in a two-bank, two-period and two-asset banking model.
Banks are assumed to be more efficient users of their loans than other financial
institutions, called outside investors, because of their special expertise and
relationship-specific skills with their loans, as in Diamond and Rajan (2001). Their
specialities imply that the financial regulator could suffer from the “too many to fail”
problem: in order to reduce the social losses due to the systemic risk of banks failing
together, the financial regulator finds it ex post optimal to bail out every troubled bank,
because the acquisition of liquidated assets by outside investors could result in a high
misallocation cost.
38 The rationale for this bailout is that many banks will fail simultaneously due to the correlation of
their assets. One might say that the motivation is that the banks are “Too Correlated to Fail”. But we
follow the terminology of Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) for reasons of consistency.
39 There are three reasons why regulators’ forbearance increases with the number of failed banks. First,
the banking service is special for both depositors and firms that rely on bank loans in the economy,
compared with other financial institutions (Diamond and Rajan, 2001); therefore, the social cost of
losing the banking service is increasing with the number of failed banks. Second, a domestic regulator
is prone to liquidate failed banks’ asset to domestic banks rather than foreign banks because of the
competition in the global financial market (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008). As the number of failed
domestic banks increases, other safe domestic banks are incapable to purchase all the failed assets. the
financial regulator has to implement the bailout. Third, the regulator is concerned with the systemic
disruption of the financial system. Korinek (2011) shows that the more banking assets being liquidated,
the larger the decline in asset prices, due to limited liquidity, which requires further sales to make
repayment obligation or regulatory obligation. This financial amplification effects can trigger the
systemic risk. Hoggarth, Reidhill and Sinclair (2004) point out network effects: the more bank failures,
the more likely that the contagious effect through financial network could reach the tipping point of
phase transition, which leads to the collapse of the financial sector as a whole.
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There are three dates, t=0, 1, 2. At t=0, banks choose whether to invest in the same
or different industries, which subsequently determines the level of correlation of
failing together. If the banks’ return from the asset is high at t=1, they will operate for
one more period. If their return is low, they could be bailed out or liquidated by the
regulator. The regulator insures depositors and maximizes social welfare. At t=1, the
financial regulator decides whether to close the failed banks or to bail the bank(s) out,
if their banking assets fail.
If only one bank fails at t=1, the regulator will pay off the failed bank’s depositors
and choose one of the following strategies: 1. allowing the failed bank’s assets to be
liquidated to outside investors, 2. allowing the assets to be liquidated to the surviving
bank, 3. bailing out the failed bank. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) show that
liquidating the failed bank’s asset to the surviving bank is optimal for both the
regulator and the surviving bank. For the regulator, bailing out the failed bank entails
the high cost of paying off the depositors, liquidating the failed bank’s asset to outside
investors yields a lower cost of deposit insurance cover but with the cost of asset
misallocation and liquidating the assets to the surviving bank could result in the same
lower cost of deposit insurance cover regarding the outside investors but with no
misallocation cost. For the surviving bank, since outside investors are inferior users of
the assets, the price of the assets, set by the outside investors’ limited fund in hand
(cash-in-the-market pricing), is always lower than the surviving bank’s willingness to
pay.
If both banks fail at t=1, Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) argue that because their
assets have to be liquidated to outside investors, which generates a high misallocation
cost, it is then ex post optimal for the regulator to bail out both banks if the bailout
cost of deposit insurance cover is lower than the cost of asset misallocation. This
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“too-many-to-fail” guarantee could then induce banks to herd ex ante by investing in
highly correlated assets, in order to receive the bailout ex post.
This chapter argues however that Acharya and Yorulmazer do not consider the full
set of strategies from which the regulator can choose in the state of systemic failure.
In the benchmark model, we show that if both banks fail, the regulator can always
commit to bailing out just one bank randomly and letting the bailed-out bank purchase
the other failed bank’s assets at the cash-in-the-market price set by the outside
investors. We show that this is an optimal strategy for the regulator to deal with
systemic failure, because the regulator can minimize both the cost of deposit
insurance and the misallocation cost. Also, the bailed out bank finds it profitable to
purchase the liquidated assets at the cash-in-the-market price. A “too many to fail”
rescue will not arise as long as it is profitable for one bank to purchase the other
bank’s liquidated assets. Thus, upon bailout, the regulator can still use the market
solution to decrease the cost of deposit insurance cover, hence decreasing the social
cost.
We then include the market price sensitive capital regulation in the model. The
universal agreement on capital regulation is that it could curb individual banks’
risk-shifting incentive, hence protecting the depositors and the regulator. A coarse risk
classification-based capital regulation, i.e. Basel 1, however, could cause several
problems, as we will discuss later. According to the fundamental principle of capital
regulation, since the degree to which solvency can be ensured depends on the
riskiness of the assets chosen by banks, the regulatory capital ratio should be a
measure of the risk of asset holding. Thus, unlike the fixed capital ratio in the first
Basel Accord, Basel 2 includes the idea of market price sensitive capital regulation in
which the measured risk of the assets is marked to the market price movement. If the
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asset price drops, the risk measurement, e.g. Value-at-Risk, increases, which means
that the bank has to increase its capital holding in order to acquire the assets. We show
that given market price sensitive capital regulation and the high cost of capital holding
by bank owners, banks would have no incentive to purchase liquidated assets at the
cash-in-the-market price. Thus, in the state of systemic failure, the regulator has to
bail out every troubled bank if the asset misallocation cost is high. A “too many to fail”
rescue arises.
Our argument is somewhat similar to Rajan (2010). In Chapter 7 of his book
“Fault Lines”, he argues that high banking assets correlation is one of the key features
of the recent crisis. The reason behind it is that the prospective and actual government
intervention creates incentives for banks to coordinate in investing in highly
correlated assets. By doing so, banks make the realization of losses more likely. But
the government helped make the high correlation more attractive than they should
have been, or maybe even making it applaud such behaviour. In addition to Rajan, our
chapter shows that the current market price sensitive capital regulation could further
distort banks’ incentive in investing in highly correlated assets.
Many researchers have criticized the current capital regulation for focusing only on
the micro-prudential policy of individual banks, whereas it fails to prevent the
banking system from systemic risk. This chapter argues, however, that the current
capital regulation may even increase the systemic risk; it could distort banks’
incentive to herd ex ante, resulting in a high likelihood of systemic failure. By curbing
the risk-shifting incentive of the individual banks, the market price sensitive capital
regulation gives rise to a problem similar to debt overhang, which restrains banks
from purchasing assets at a low price because of the high cost of capital.
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The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of capital
regulation. Section 3 discusses the related literature. Section 4 presents the benchmark
model and the analysis. Section 5 analyses the effect of market price-sensitive capital
regulation on the benchmark model. Section 6 discusses the result and policy
implication, and section 7 concludes. The references and appendices are in section 8
and 9 respectively.
2. An Overview of Capital Regulation
Early banking theories, such as those of Diamond (1984) and Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), argue that banks play an important role in completing the market and
providing special expertise and relationships in monitoring the loans. These theories
also suggest the possibility of bank runs, such as those that occurred in the Great
Depression, which then gives the justification for the government to implement
deposit insurance. However, deposit insurance encourages banks’ risk-shifting
incentives. Banks’ moral hazard problem related to the choice of investment provides
the main rationale for implementing prudential regulation.
From the 1930s to the 1970s, financial authorities regulated the banking sector
using several instruments, such as regulation of the market structure, assets allocation
rules, interest rate rules or a mixture of these instruments. During this period, banking
activities rarely crossed national borders and it was easy for domestic regulators to
manage the competition in the banking sector. In the late 1970s, these regulatory
instruments were largely dismantled. Hellwig (2008) points out that the trend towards
deregulation in this period was because the liberalization of international capital flows,
the globalization of financial activities, the financial innovations and the revolution in
information and communication technologies intensified the competition in financial
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sectors all over the world. These regulatory instruments weakened banks’ ability to
cope with increased risk in a world of wide fluctuations in interest rates and exchange
rates, and most importantly weakened the position of domestic banks competing with
foreign banks. Thus, during the early 1980s, there was an incentive for countries to
compete in deregulation.
During the period of increasing deregulation and financial market globalization, in
1988 bank regulators from G-10 countries agreed on the bank capital regulation
following the terms recommended by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS) of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). Aiming to harmonize the
international competition on domestic banking deregulation, the Basel Accord of 1988
stipulated minimum capital requirements for banks. Charging the capital amounted to
8% of risky loans was believed to reduce their incentive to gamble and also to reduce
the cost of deposit insurance for regulators once a bank became bankrupt. From then
on, capital regulation has been the cornerstone of financial regulation for banks.
The first Basel, however, received several criticisms in the late 1980s and early
1990s. Two main drawbacks attracted most of the attention. First, coarse risk buckets
in which assets are classified induce capital regulation arbitrage that could allow
banks to hold riskier assets with a relatively low capital ratio. Second, the
non-risk-based capital regulation on market risk, the so-called “standard approach”,
was said to mark a step back from the quality of risk management. It brings potential
distortion, because it imposes the same cost of capital mark-up on different types of
assets. The Basel Accord ignores the fact that banks possess special expertise in
managing their loans through the development of quantitative models with an empirical
and conceptual foundation. Risk management on the basis of banks’ own quantitative
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models was deemed to be much closer to the true risks that different assets posed for the
banks than the rigid Basel Accord capital regulation.
In 1996 the Amendment to the Basel Accord, “Basel 2”, was proposed. Basel 2
allows banks to use a model-based approach, known as the Internal Ratings Based
Approach (IRB), in which banks’ capital holding is an increasing function of banks’
estimates of the probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD) of the assets.
This approach encourages banks to use their special expertise to create their own
internal systems to manage risks. The modification of “Basel” was designed to improve
the risk calibration of capital requirements – regulatory capital aims to be more closely
attuned to the “actual” risks in banking. However, the IRB approach implies that the
financial regulators give more freedom to banks in charge of their own risk
management activity, which could again lead to moral hazard behaviour. To tackle this
problem, Basel 2 introduces marking to market or fair value pricing on the riskiness of
assets.
Under marking to market the level of the capital ratio banks are required to hold
depends on the market value of the assets. As asset prices drop, risk measures increase,
not only leading to higher capital ratio costs (a high margin requirement and haircut)
for the banks holding these assets, but also reducing the risk appetite for other banks
to purchase such assets. The haircut is typically obtained from risk measures like
Value at Risk. While the definitions of these measures have their own shortcomings,
the bigger problem is how they are estimated. Typically these risk measures are
estimated naively using past data. Hence, a sharp price drop leads to a sharp increase
in the estimates of these risk measures. The direct result of this risk calibration of
regulatory capital is that banks’ ability to sell or buy the assets is very susceptible to
the market condition. This so-called “market discipline” works well only if the market
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in question is functioning. If the financial market is illiquid, the Value at Risk
measurement of assets’ value may not be beneficial for banks and the regulator. In
times of bank failure, the illiquid market leads to a situation in which the prices do not
reflect the future payoffs but rather reflect the amount of cash available to the buyers
in the market- a cash-in-the-market pricing.
3. Related Literature
As mentioned above, the idea of regulators’ “too many to fail” problem is formally
discussed by Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007). Brown and Dinc (2009) find evidence
that the “too-many-to-fail” effect is robust in many emerging markets. In addition,
they argue that regulators’ intervention in the recent crisis can also be a very good
example of a “too-many-to-fail” rescue in developed countries. Kasa and Spiegel
(1999) show that regulators appear to practice excessive regulatory forbearance when
there are severe problems for many banks. Similar findings are presented by Barth,
Caprio and Levine (2006) and Reidhill and Sinclair (2004).
The “too many to fail” problem also relates to bank herding and systemic risk.
Wagner (2006) shows that portfolio diversification could exacerbate the systemic risk
if there is fire-sale externality. Acharya (2009) shows that individual bank failure
could induce both positive and negative externalities in the surviving banks. If the
negative externality of a higher cost of the interest rate triggered by the failure of
other banks dominates ex post, then ex ante banks tend to herd in order to avoid
failing individually. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2005) show that the failure of one bank
conveys adverse information about the systematic factor in bank loan returns and
increases the cost of borrowing for the surviving banks relative to the case with no
bank failures. Hence, banks herd ex ante to increase the likelihood of joint survival.
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The analysis of capital regulation’s effect on banks’ behaviour has mainly been
based on a representative banking model. The literature mostly examines the
consequences of capital rules for banks’ choice of asset riskiness. Furlong and Keeley
(1989) demonstrate that capital requirements reduce risk-taking incentives. Koehn and
Santomero (1980, 1988) and Rochet (1992) show that improperly chosen risk weights
may increase the riskiness of banks. Repullo and Suarez (2007) analyse the cyclical
effects of Basel 2 in a dynamic equilibrium model. They show that there could be a
significant contraction in the supply of credit when the economy enters a recession, an
effect that does not occur under Basel 1 capital requirements. In a similar vein,
Guillaume et al. (2005) argue that marking to market pricing could inject excessive
volatility into financial markets. They argue that in times of crisis market prices are
not accurate measures of value. Some discussion articles by Brunnermeier (2008),
Brunnermeier et al. (2009) and Hellwig (2009) all criticize the effect of market
price-sensitive capital regulation on financial market volatility. They argue that the
current Basel 2 is excessively focused on seeking to improve the behaviour and risk
management practices of individual banks, but not on wider systemic issues. In
contrast to these papers, we focus on banks’ ex ante interaction behaviour under
market price sensitive capital regulation.
4. The Benchmark Model
We first consider the benchmark model in which no capital requirement is imposed on
banks. An economy, with three dates t=0, 1, 2, consists of four different types of
agents: bank owners A and B, the regulator, the depositors and the outside investors.
We assume that all the agents are risk neutral.
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Each bank can borrow from a continuum of depositors of measure 1, each endowed
with 1 unit of consumption goods at t=0 and t=1. The depositors have access to a
reservation investment opportunity that gives a return of 1 per unit of investment at
t+1. They choose to invest their endowment in the reservation investment opportunity
or in their bank at t=0 and t=1. A deposit is in a simple form of a non-state contingent
debt contract with maturity of one period; the contract is independent of the realized
return and the banks’ investment strategy.
The banks are endowed with a risky investment technology that needs 1 unit of
consumption good at t=0 and t=1.40 The performance of banks’ loans determines the
return at t+1. For simplicity, we assume with probability  that the return from the
investment is high, 1R , and with probability 1 that the return is zero. The
returns in the two periods are independent. The banks are also endowed with their
own funds K. They can decide whether to invest using deposits only or both the
deposits and their own capital. However, there are private costs for banks to invest
using their own capital. These costs can be due to manager–shareholder conflicts
(Dewatripont and Tirole, 1993), asymmetric information of the equity holders (Froot,
Scharfstein and Stein, 1993) or informed trading in capital markets (Froot and Stein,
1998). Here we simply treat the capital cost as the cost of dilution: an equity issue
results in a transfer of value from the existing shareholders.41 This then implies that if
there is no capital regulation banks only use deposits to invest.
We assume that banks can choose their investment in one of the different industries,
say real estate or manufacturing, denoted as 1 and 2. Bank A (B) can lend to firms A1
40 The risky technology is to be thought of as a portfolio of loans to firms in a corporate sector.
41 See Lee et al. (1996) on the empirical evidence of underpricing the costs of outside equity, and the
theoretical justifications for diluting cost of outside equity by Leland and Pyle (1977).
or A2 (B1 or B2) in industries 1 and 2, respectively.42 The two banks’ investment
choice determines the correlation of bank returns. If in equilibrium the banks choose
to lend to firms in the same industry, specifically they either lend to A1 and B1 or to
A2 and B2, then they are assumed to be perfectly correlated, that is, 1 .
Conversely, if Banks A and B choose different industries, then for simplicity we
assume that their returns have no correlation at all: 0 .
Let ))(( uE be the bank’s expected profit from the investment given the
correlation. In a Nash equilibrium, if the banks invest in the same industry, that is, in
(A1 and B1) or (A2 and B2), they then receive ))0((uE . Thus, for the same level of
correlation, the identity of the industries in which the banks invest does not matter in
terms of bank returns. In other words, while there may be multiple Nash equilibria
resulting in the same level of correlation, they are the payoff equivalent. Thus, we
only focus on the correlation, rather than on individual industries, for the banks’
choice. Specifically, given the symmetry in our basic model, banks invest in the same
industry if ))0(())1(( uEuE  , and invest in different industries otherwise. This gives
us the joint distribution of banks’ returns in Table 1. Bank owners and depositors
obtain a time additive utility ut where ut is the expected wealth at time t.
A/B High Low
42 We assume
invests in only103
High  0
Low 0 1
that the information costs of investing in both industries are very high so that each bank
one industry; see Acharya (2009).
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lator provides deposit insurance to the depositors at t=1 only, because t=2
eriod of the economy. The regulator’s objective is to maximize the social
ilout, the regulator can punish the bank by acquiring a fraction  of the
it, where 10   .43 However, when a bank is bailed out, the regulator
the entire cost of the deposit insurance cover. This is because the
share of the bailed-out bank’s profit is not pledgeable in capital markets,
not reduce the immediacy costs for providing deposit insurance.44 Hence,
associated with an opportunity cost for the regulator relative to bank sales.
rtunity costs are also part of the regulator’s objective function.
utside investors are endowed with a limited amount of funds. They can
eir endowment either at t=1 or at t=2 with no discounting. Outside
e inefficient users of banking assets; they can only generate R from the
lar to investors in Diamond and Rajan’s study (2001).45 Thus, when the
argue that the regulator can exploit a high fraction of the profit upon bailout, 1 , in
ent banks from herding. However, Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) argue that bank
an incentive to shirk if they have a low fraction of the asset return. In equilibrium, the
never choose the fraction that violates bank owners’ IC constraint. In our model, we
e level of the binding IC constraint, as in Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007).
f providing funds with immediacy can be linked to a variety of sources, such as the
effects of a tax increase required to fund deposit insurance and bailouts and the likely
rnment deficits on the country’s exchange rate, manifested in the fact that twin crises
curred in many countries. For a detailed discussion on the costs associated with banking
bailouts, see Calomiris (1998) and Hoggarth, Reis and Saporta (2002).
nd Rajan (2001) assume relationship-specific skills of bank managers compared with
hereas we assume a distinction in skills between bank managers and outside investors.
ble 1: Joint distribution of bank returns under different correlations
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banking assets are liquidated to outside investors, there is a social welfare loss due to
the misallocation of the assets. Let p denote the outside investors’ maximum
willingness to pay for the liquidated asset. We assume that the outside investors’
endowment at t=1 is no more than their willingness to pay for the assets. This then
implies that the price of the liquidated assets is subject to the limited amount of cash
held by outside investors– a cash-in-the-market pricing.46 In addition, we assume that
the cash-in-the-market price of liquidated assets decreases as the number of liquidated
assets increases.47 Let Ip denote the cash-in-the-market price of the liquidated assets
when only one bank fails – individual failure – and Sp denote the price of the
liquidated assets if there is systemic failure. We then have SI ppp  . Note that
because outside investors are risk neutral, they are indifferent between consuming at
t=1 and lending to banks if there is no investment opportunity, as long as the expected
return is equal to 1.
4.1 Analysis
We start with the analysis of the banks’ and the regulator’s strategies and payoffs at
t=1. There are four possible states: 1) both Bank A and Bank B survive and receive a
high return on the loans, denoted SS; 2) Bank A survives whereas Bank B fails,
The notion that outsiders may not be able to use the banking assets as efficiently as the existing bank
owners is also akin to the notion of asset specificity, first introduced into the corporate finance
literature by Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Wllianmson (1988). This literature suggests that firms
whose assets tend to be specific, that is, whose assets cannot be readily redeployed by firms outside the
industry, are likely to experience lower liquidation values because they may suffer from fire-sale
discounts in cash auctions for asset sales. James (1991) shows that there is significant going concern
value that is preserved if the failed bank is liquidated by the FDIC.
46 For a detailed discussion of cash-in-the-market pricing, see Allen and Gale (1994, 1998). They
develop a theory that under incomplete market participation of investors and market illiquidity, the
need for liquidity at short notice will lead to an inelastic supply of liquidity in the short run. It then
causes asset price fluctuation.
47 Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that if there are two types of potential buyers of a firm’s asset –
the same industry and industry outsiders – when the same-industry firms are highly correlated, then the
failure of many firms causes a higher inefficiency cost and a lower liquidation price. This idea is also
employed by Morris and Shin (2004), who assert that correlated failure is more costly, since it will
cause more risk discounts due to higher levels of uncertainty.
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receiving zero return and facing the resolution by the regulator, denoted SF; 3) Bank
B survives whereas Bank A receives zero return and faces the resolution by the
regulator, denoted FS; 4) both banks fail at t=1, FF. Let j denote the possible state
where  FFFSSFSSj ,,, .
1. Both banks survive (SS)
Because of the deposit insurance in the first period, the banks’ promised rate of
interest to depositors at t=0 is 10 r . In the second period, without loss of any
generality, the deposit rate is denoted as 1r . We then have 01 rrR  . In this state, both
banks have enough return to pay off the depositors and invest again. The depositors
receive 0 if the return is low and 1r if the return is high. Banks’ expected payoff in
state SS, denoted )( 2SSuE , is:
1)()( 12  RrRuE
SS  (1)
Note that the expected payoff is independent of bank correlation, because t=2 is the
last period of the economy.
2. Only one bank fails (SF or FS)
These two states happen if and only if the banks’ correlation is 0 . Since these two
states are symmetric, we only consider the case in which A has a positive return and B
has zero return. Bank B cannot continue to operate for one more period because it
cannot pay back the depositor 0r . Its assets will be liquidated, unless there is a bailout.
The liquidation price is determined by the cash outside investors are willing to pay Ip .
The regulator has three strategies: 1) to liquidate the assets to outside investors, 2) to
liquidate the assets to Bank A, 3) to bail out Bank B. If the regulator lets Bank A
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purchase Bank B’s assets, Bank A can access B’s depositors, and borrow from outside
investors. Thus, Bank A can borrow one unit from its own depositors, one unit from
Bank B’s depositors and Ip units from the outside investors for second-period
investments. We can show that:
Lemma 1: It is optimal for the regulator to liquidate Bank B’s asset to Bank A, and it
is also profitable for Bank A to purchase the assets at the cash-in-the-market price Ip
by accessing Bank B’s depositors and borrowing from the outside investors.
Proof: See appendix.
3. Both banks fail (FF)
In state FF the regulator’s objective is to maximize the total expected output of the
banking sector, subtracting any cost of bailout or liquidation. We denote )( 2FFUE as
the regulator’s objective function in FF. There are four strategies from which
regulator can choose:
a) The regulator can bail out both banks
The regulator’s objective function takes the value:
02 2)1(2)( rRUE
FF   (2)
In this case the only cost for the regulator is to pay off the two banks’ depositors. The
cost of the deposit insurance cover requires 02r .
b) The regulator liquidates both banks’ assets to outside investors
The regulator’s objective function takes the value:
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     222)1(22212)( 002 rpRrpRUE
SSFF (3)
The required fund to provide deposit insurance covers is 02r net of the proceeds
from the sale of the liquidated assets at Sp2 , and 2 is the cost of misallocation
incurred by liquidating the assets to outside investors.
c) The regulator randomly bails out one bank and liquidates another bank’s assets to
outside investors
The regulator’s objective function in this case is:
     002 2)1(2)2(1)1()( rpRprRRUE
SSFF (4)
d) The regulator randomly bails out one bank and lets the bailed-out bank acquire the
failed bank’s assets at the cash-in-the-market price
The regulator’s objective function takes the value:
SSFF prRprrRUE  0002 2)1(2)()1(2)(  (5)
where the second term in the first equality is the cost of the deposit insurance for the
failed bank and the third term is the cost to pay off the depositor for the bailed-out
bank. Note that given Lemma 1 we know that the bailed-out bank is willing to
purchase the liquidated assets at the cash-in-the-market price.
Comparing these four expected payoffs, we can obtain the following bailout policy
for the regulator:
Lemma 2: In state FF, if  2Sp , the regulator liquidates both banks’ assets to
outside investors. If  2Sp , the regulator always randomly bails out one bank and
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lets this bailed-out bank acquire the failed bank’s assets at the cash-in-the-market
price.
Let )( 2FFuE denote the banks’ expected payoff in state FF. If  2Sp , the
regulator randomly bails out one bank, each bank have a probability of ½ of being
bailed out. After the bailout the regulator takes  fraction of the bank’s profit. We
then have
 










20
2)1(2)1(
2
1
)( 2 S
SS
FF
pif
pifpR
uE (6)
First-period (t=0) investment correlation
We now characterize the banks’ strategy in the first period. At t=0, the banks choose
whether to invest in the same assets or different assets, i.e. the banks choose the
correlation  . Since Bank A and Bank B are ex ante identical, we only consider a
representative bank, say Bank A. The bank’s objective function, at t=0, is to
maximize:
))(())(( 21  uEuE  .
We ignore the discount factor since it does not contribute anything to the result. If
the banks invest in the same industry, then their correlation is 1 , otherwise it is
equal to 0. Since the banks pay the depositors the promised return 0r only if the
return on loans is high, the expected payoff of each bank from its first-period
investment is:
)1()()( 01  RrRuE  (7)
The bank’s first-period expected payoff is independent of the correlation level. The
banks only take into account the second-period profits when choosing  .
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The second-period expected return needs to take account of different states; we
then have:

j
juEjuE ))(()Pr())(( 22  (8)
where  FFFSSFSSj ,,, .
From Table 1 we can see that if banks invest in different industries, we have
)()1()()1()()1()())0(( 2
2
222
2
2
FFFSSFSS uEuEuEuEuE   (9)
Note that from lemma 1 we know that in state FS liquidating the failed bank’s assets
to the surviving bank is the dominant strategy for the regulator, hence its expected
utility in state FS is zero.
If the banks invest in the same industry we have:
)()1()())1(( 222
FFSS uEuEuE   (10)
The probability of being in state SF or state FS is equal to zero if the correlation is
1 . Using lemma 1 (see equation A.1), we can express the banks’ expected payoff
in state SF as:
ISSSF puEuE  )(2)( 22 (11)
and we can use equation (6) to express the banks’ expected payoff in state FF for
 2Sp :
 SSSFF puEuE  )(2)1(
2
1)( 22  (12)
We then have






 SISS ppuEuEuE )1(
2
1)()1())1(())0(( 222  (13)
To rearrange the equation we have:






 )
2
1)(1())(()1())1(())0(( 222
SIISS pppuEuEuE  (14)
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The first term in the square bracket is positive given lemma 1. The second term in
the square bracket is also positive given that the cash-in-the-market price of the
liquidated assets is lower in systemic failure than in individual failure. We can show
that the sign of the difference between the expected utility of choosing correlation 0
and the expected utility of choosing correlation 1 depends on  and the price
difference of the liquidated assets between systemic failure and individual failure.
According to lemma 2, bailout only happens in state FF; if one bank is chosen to be
bailed out, the expected payoff in the second period depends on  . Intuitively, the
larger the fraction of the profit exploited by the regulator given bailout, the less
incentive the banks have to be bailed out. The banks’ profit also depends on the
cash-in-the-market prices in the two states. The greater the difference between the
liquidated price of the assets in systemic failure and the liquidated price of the assets
in individual failure, the more incentive banks have to choose highly correlated assets
in order to exploit the high profit in the systemic risk because of the relatively low
liquidation price. If the difference between the liquidation price in systemic failure
and the liquidation price in individual failure is not too high, banks have less incentive
to herd and therefore more incentive to choose 0 . We then have:
Lemma 3: If  2Sp , the regulator liquidates both banks to outside investors in
state FF, and banks choose the lowest level of correlation 0 . If  2Sp , the
choice of banks’ correlation level depends on the  , the expected payoff in state SS
and the cash-in-the-market price Sp and Ip . If )
2
1)(1())(( 2
SIISS pppuE   ,
the banks choose the lowest level of correlation 0 , otherwise the banks choose the
highest level of correlation 1 .
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The combination of the three lemmas above characterizes the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium. We then have:
Proposition 1: In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the regulator does not
intervene in state SS. The regulator always liquidates the assets to the surviving bank
in states SF and FS. The surviving bank finds it profitable to acquire the other bank’s
assets at the cash-in-the-market price. In state FF, if  2Sp , the regulator has a
dominant strategy: it randomly bails out just one bank and liquidates the failed bank’s
assets to the bailed-out bank. It is profitable for the bailed-out bank to acquire the
asset at the cash-in-the-market price. If )
2
1)(1())(( 2
SIISS pppuE   , the
banks invest in different assets at t=0, otherwise the banks invest in the same asset, i.e.
1 . If  2Sp , the regulator liquidates the two assets to outside investors. There
is no “too-many-to-fail” rescue in the subgame perfect equilibrium.
5. Market Price Sensitive CAR and “Too-Many-to-Fail” Rescue
We now include market price-sensitive capital regulation in the benchmark model.
We denote the asset price as 0p , if the assets are not being liquidated. Otherwise the
price of the assets is determined by the cash-in-the-market pricing. The asset price
0p can be assumed as the standard discounted value of future dividends of the assets
that can be exploited by Banks A and B. Given the assumption that outside investors
are inferior users of the assets and the liquidated asset price is marked to the
cash-in-the-market, which decreases with the number of bank failures, we then have
SI pppp 0 .
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The market price sensitive capital regulation implies that the capital requirement
increases if the asset price decreases. We then have 0)(' pk and 0)('' pk . The
increasing margin of capital requirement is in line with Basel 2’s regulation on asset
credit rating and CAR as shown in Figure 1.48
We denote the cost of capital for individual banks as )(k , and 0)(' k and
0)('' k .49 There is a conflict of interest between social welfare and individual
banks’ interest in capital-raising effort, as banking capital generates a high benefit for
social welfare relative to its individual cost.50 Here we assume that the social cost of
the bank’s capital adequacy requirement is equal to zero.
Note that the fundamental reason for capital regulation is that it can curb individual
banks’ risk-shifting incentive. We can assume there are two levels of risky portfolio
48 Note that the credit rating is also based on VaR for risk measurement. In general, the decrease in the
asset price increases the VaR measure and the required rate of return for the underlying asset, which
increases its probability of default and thus decreases its credit rating (see Brunnermeier and Pedersen,
2008 and Brunnermeier et al., 2009).
49 Hellwig (2008) and Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2008) argue that banks compete in lowering the
equity/debt ratio. A high equity/debt ratio can send a negative signal to the market. The greater the
equity issuance, the less competitive a bank is, in turn making it more difficult to attract finance.
50 Bernanke (2008) argues that the capital-raising effort is crucial for the stability of the financial
system. Failing to do so will pose negative externalities for the broader economy, losing new profit
opportunities and deepening the economic recession. Miles et al. (2011) also argue that the social
benefit greatly outweighs individual banks’ cost of capital. The current capital regulation imposed on
banks is much less than the socially desirable one.
AAA
CAR
Worst
rating
Figure 1
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that a bank can choose in each industry – high risk and low risk – denoted  LHi , ,
with a mean-preserving spread. In the benchmark model, since there is no capital
regulation, bank tends to choose a high-risk asset portfolio due to the risk-shifting
problem. When capital regulation is imposed on banks, banks are likely to choose an
investment portfolio with lower risk. We then have )()( LRHR  and )()( LH   .
Since this chapter focuses on the regulator’s bailout decision under systemic risk, we
can take the effect of capital requirement on the individual risk-shifting problem as
given, and just focus on banks’ investment correlation. Without loss of any generality,
we then assign the same notation to asset returns and the probability of success as in
the benchmark model. The reader should bear in mind that the individual risk levels
can be different in the two cases.51
5.1 Analysis
We start with our analysis of four states at t=1, that is,  FFFSSFSSj ,,, .
1. Both banks survive (SS)
As before, the deposit insurance in the first period implies 10 r . In the second period,
the deposit rate is denoted as 1r . We then have 01 rrR  . In this state, both banks
have enough consumption goods to invest again. The bank’s expected payoff in state
SS, denoted )( 2SSuE , is:
51 Also note that we do not consider the case in which two banks play a game on the choice of risk
level. There may be an equilibrium in which banks choose a low risk level at t=0, in order to purchase
liquidated assets at a low price at t=1. However, since our paper focuses on the effect of capital
regulation on the strategic choice of banks’ correlation, this equilibrium does not affect the main result
of the paper. We will leave this matter for further research. We can impose the condition that the
decision on the risk level is only made at t=0 and a high-risk portfolio can generate a high enough
return at t=1, which is greater than the sum of the returns at t=1 and t=2 if the banks choose a low-risk
portfolio.
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where, in the first equation, the first term is the expected return net of the promised
return to the depositors, which is 1r times the total amount of the deposit ))(1( 0pk ,
the second term is the banks’ capital investment at asset price 0p and the last term
refers to the banks’ cost of capital at 0p . We can simplify the first equation as the
second expression.
2. Only one bank fails (SF or FS)
The regulator’s objective is to maximize the total expected output of the banking
sector, subtracting any cost of bailout or liquidation. Again, these two states happen if
and only if the correlation is 0 , and we only consider the state in which A has a
high return and B has zero return due to the state symmetry. Bank B cannot operate
the assets for one more period because it cannot pay back the depositor 0r . Hence, its
assets will be liquidated at the cash-in-the-market price, unless there is a bailout. We
can show that:
Lemma 4: The profitability for Bank A to purchase the liquidated assets depends on
the cost of capital at the cash-in-the-market price:
1. If ))(()1( II pkpR   , Bank A is willing to purchase the assets at the
liquidated price, and it is optimal for the regulator to liquidate B’s assets to A.
2. If ))(()1( II pkpR   , Bank A is unwilling to purchase the assets at the
liquidated price. The regulator bails out the failed bank if  Ip , and the regulator
liquidates the assets to outside investors if  Ip .
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Proof: See appendix.
The argument is similar to lemma 1: the regulator is always willing to liquidate the
assets to the surviving bank because it avoids the asset misallocation cost and
decreases the cost of deposit insurance. However, Bank A could find it unprofitable to
purchase the liquidated asset at the cash-in-the-market price if there is a high cost of
capital holding. Bank A’s decision on the purchase of the liquidated assets depends on
the cost of capital holding at Ip .
3. Both banks fail (FF)
Without loss of any generality, we denote )( 2FFUE as the regulator’s objective
function in FF. Note that the regulator’s available strategies depend on the bank’s
willingness to acquire the liquidated asset. There are four possible strategies for the
regulator:
a) The regulator bails out both banks
The objective function takes the value:
))(1(2)1(2)( 02 pkRUE
FF   (16)
In this strategy, the only cost is to pay off the depositors, which is ))(1(2 0pk .
b) The regulator liquidates both banks’ assets to outside investors
The regulator’s objective function takes the value:
  2))(1(22)1(2)( 02 pkpRUE
SFF (17)
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The regulator pays off the depositors ))(1(2 0pk , receives the proceeds from the
liquidation of the assets to outside investors Sp2 and incurs the cost of misallocation
for two liquidated assets 2 .
c) The regulator randomly bails out one bank and liquidates the other bank’s assets to
outside investors
The regulator’s objective function in this case is:
  ))(1(2)1(2)( 02 pkpRUE
SFF (18)
The regulator faces the social cost of asset misallocation of just one liquidated asset
and receives Sp amount of funds to cover the cost of the deposit insurance
))(1(2 0pk .
d) The regulator randomly bails out one bank and lets the bailed-out bank acquire the
failed bank’s assets at the cash-in-the-market price?
The feasibility of this strategy depends on the cost of capital holding at the
cash-in-the-market price Sp . The expected payoff for the bailed out bank purchasing
the liquidated assets is:
 
 ))((1)()1(
))(())(()(2)1()(
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12
SSSS
SSFF
pkpRuE
pkpkprRuE

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

(19)
The profitability for the bailed out bank to purchase the assets depends on the cost
of capital holding ))(( Spk . If ))(()1( SS pkpR   , the banks are reluctant to
purchase the liquidated assets at the cash-in-the-market price, which in turn rules out
the strategy for the regulator to bail out one bank randomly and let the bailed out bank
acquire the other bank’s assets at the cash-in-the-market price.
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However, for ))(()1( SS pkpR   , the regulator can still implement this
strategy. The payoff for the regulator is:
))(1(2)1(2)( 02 pkpRUE
SFF   (20)
There is no misallocation cost in this case.
Comparing these expected payoffs, we can obtain the following bailout policy for
the regulator in state FF:
Lemma 5: In state FF, the regulator’s strategy is as follows:
1. If ))(()1( SS pkpR   , for  2Sp the regulator liquidates both banks’ assets
to outside investors. If  2Sp , the regulator always randomly bails out one bank
and lets this bailed-out bank acquire the other failed bank’s assets at the
cash-in-the-market price.
2. If ))(()1( SS pkpR   , for  Sp , the regulator liquidates both banks’ assets
to outside investors; for  Sp , the regulator bails out both banks.
Given lemma 5, we can then derive the expected payoff for individual banks in
state FF:
1. If ))(()1( SS pkpR   , we then have:
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2. If ))(()1( SS pkpR   , the expected payoff for banks is:
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First-period (t=0) investment correlation
We now characterize banks’ strategy for choosing their correlation level at t=0. In this
section, we only focus on the interesting case in which there is no “too big to fail”,
thus ))(()1( II pkpR   and  Ip , and consider the case of a “too many to
fail” rescue ))(()1( SS pkpR   and  Sp . The full analysis of banks’
strategic choices of correlation and the regulator’s bailout policy under different
conditions is shown in the appendix.
Banks’ objective function is to maximize ))(()( 21 uEuE  . Again, since the
first-period expected payoff does not depend on the correlation level, we only focus
on the second-period profits when banks choose  .
The expected second-period return has to take account of different states. We have:

j
juEjuE ))(()Pr())(( 22 
where  FFFSSFSSj ,,, .
From Table 1 we can see that if banks invest in different industries, we have
)()1()()1()()1()())0(( 2
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2
FFFSSFSS uEuEuEuEuE   (23)
whereas if banks invest in the same industry we have:
)()1()())1(( 222
FFSS uEuEuE   (24)
The probability of being in state SF is equal to zero, if the correlation is 1 .
For ))(()1( II pkpR   , the banks’ expected payoff in state FS is:
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In the case where there is no “too big to fail” rescue, we then have  Ip ; in
addition, if the cash-in-the-market price of the liquidated assets is small in systemic
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failure, we then have  Sp . In this case, the banks’ expected payoff under
correlation zero is:
)()1()()1()())0(( 2
2
22
2
2
FFSFSS uEuEuEuE  
From lemma 4 we have that banks’ expected payoff in state SF is:
)()( 22
SSSF uEuE 
Since the surviving bank finds it unprofitable to purchase the liquidated assets at Ip ,
the bank’s expected payoff in state FS is zero, since the regulator finds it less costly to
liquidate the assets to an outside investor.
Recall lemma 5, we can show:
)()1()( 22
SSFF uEuE  (26)
The bank’s expected payoff under correlation 1 is:
)()1)(1()())1(( 222
SSSS uEuEuE   (27)
We then have
)()1)(1())1(())0(( 222
SSuEuEuE   (28)
In this case, the banks choose correlation 1 as long as  is less than 1. Compared
with equation (14), in which the banks’ strategy regarding correlation depends on the
value of four variables, we could have an increase in systemic risk due to the market
price sensitive capital requirement and the “too many to fail” bailout policy. We can
show that:
Proposition 2: Consider ))(()1( II pkpR   and ))(()1( SS pkpR   , in
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium: the regulator does not intervene in the state
SS. If  Ip and  Sp , in state SF and FS, the regulator liquidates the assets to
outside investors. In state FF, the regulator bails out both banks. The banks choose the
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highest correlation, 1 , as long as 1 . If  Ip and  Sp , in states SF,
FS and FF, the regulator liquidates the failed bank(s) assets to outside investors. The
banks are indifferent between choosing correlation 1 and choosing correlation 0. If
 Ip and  Sp , in states SF, FS and FF, the regulator bails out the bank(s) as
long as there is bank failure. The banks are indifferent between choosing correlation 1
and choosing correlation 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
6. Discussion
6.1. Social Losses
We first discuss the social losses under the benchmark model and the model with a
market sensitive capital requirement. Suppose that equation 14 is positive, the banks
then choose different industries to invest in the benchmark model. In this case, the
regulator’s expected loss at t=0 is:
)2())(1()1))((1)((2 2 SI pHpHH  
Given equation 27, we then have the expected social cost in the economy with a
price-sensitive capital requirement:
))(1))((1(2 0pkL  
We assume that the banks choose different risky portfolios; intuitively we have
))()( LH   . The social cost is not necessarily higher in the benchmark model than
in the model with market price sensitive capital requirement. The social cost is greater
with the market price-sensitive capital requirement if:
))(1))((1(2)2())(1()1))((1)((2 02 pkLpHpHH SI   (29)
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Even if the bank chooses a high correlation in the benchmark model, the regulator
can still use a market solution upon bailout, because the bailed-out bank still finds it
profitable to purchase the liquidated assets by borrowing from the outside investors;
this then decreases the regulator’s cost on bailout. In the case of a price-sensitive
capital requirement, however, the market solution is ruled out because of the high cost
of capital holding, which may increase the cost of bailout for the regulator. Suppose
that in both cases the banks choose high correlation, equation 5 indicates that the
regulator’s expected cost of bailout at t=0 is then )2))((1( SpH   , whereas the
expected bailout cost in the case of a market price-sensitive capital requirement is
))(1))((1(2 0pkL   , as in equation 16. It can be the case that:
))(1))((1(2)2))((1( 0pkLpH S   (30)
In particular, if a bank can create off-balance-sheet “conduits”, with loans placed in
“conduits”, the bank just needs to maintain relatively low capital against them.
However, to make it easier for the “conduits” to obtain funds, the bank provides
guarantees of the underlying credit, essentially bringing the risk back onto itself, even
if it is not shown on the balance sheet. This “regulation arbitrage” can then let the
bank invest in high-risk assets with low capital holding in a normal time. In the
extreme case, if we have ))()( LH   and )( 0pk is small enough, conditions 29 and
30 hold.
6.2. Market Liquidity
Our results rely on the assumption that the market is illiquid. The notion that the
market value of the asset can be below the expected present value of future cash flows
seems to contradict the traditional theory of asset pricing under an
information-efficient market. However, this theory is based on the assumption that the
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market is completely frictionless and the market prices fully reflect the fundamental
values of all the assets and liabilities. The efficiency properties of competitive
equilibrium can then be derived. However, theoretical analyses have shown if market
is incomplete (see Gale, 2012), borrowers have agency problem (see Kiyotaki and
Moore, 1997), or market participants have the “lemons” concern (see Brunnermeier
2008), the market reactions to shocks can be quite extreme. In times of financial crisis,
the interaction of institutions and markets leads to situations in which the prices in
illiquid markets do not reflect the future payoffs but rather reflect the amount of cash
available to the buyers in the market. If the financial market is illiquid, imposing a
market price-sensitive capital requirement on financial institutions may not be
beneficial. The relevant analogy here is with the theory of the second best from
welfare economics. When there is more than one imperfection in a competitive
economy, removing just one of these imperfections, like an individual bank’s
risk-shifting problem, is not necessarily welfare-improving. It is possible that the
removal of one of the imperfections will magnify the likelihood of systemic failure,
which imposes a high cost on the overall welfare, as we have discussed in section 6.1.
Thus, simply moving to a market price sensitive capital regulation without addressing
the other imperfections in the financial system need not guarantee a welfare
improvement, as pointed out by Plantin, Haresh and Shin (2008).
6.3. Macro-Prudential Policy
To tackle the problem, financial authorities need to focus on regulating the financial
system as a whole. However, the current capital regulation is excessively focused on
seeking to improve the behaviour and risk management practices of individual banks,
which is too micro-prudential. At the same time, wider systemic issues have been
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ignored, meaning an insufficient macro-prudential policy. More importantly, we have
shown that an inadequate ex ante micro-prudential policy could lead to a high
probability of systemic risk ex post. We know that monetary policy can have a role in
the leaning against the wind approach. Bank regulation should also have this property.
Our analysis supports the idea of state-dependent or countercyclical capital regulation,
suggested by, for instance, Alessandri and Haldane (2009), Barrell and Davis (2011),
Korinek (2011), Kashyap and Stein (2004) and Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2008),
which argue that the regulator should commit to relaxing the capital ratio in a bad
state of the world. Kashyap and Stein (2004) argue that time-varying capital
requirements emerge as an optimal scheme in a model in which the social planner
maximizes a welfare function that weights both the micro-prudential objective of
protecting the deposit insurance fund and the macro-prudential objective of
maintaining credit creation during recessions. At a time when the market stops
functioning, when bank capital is scarce and the credit supply is tight, the regulator
concerned with both objectives should be willing to tolerate a higher probability of
bank failure than in good times. Alessandri and Haldane (2009) and Kashyap, Rajan
and Stein (2008) additionally suggest the idea of capital insurance, which involves a
bank purchasing an insurance policy that pays off in a bad state of the world. To
address concerns about the insurer defaulting, the policy would be fully collateralized,
that is, the insurer would put the full amount of the policy into a locked box up front.
In both cases, the idea is to make capital less costly in a bad state relative to a good
state. Our model suggests that if the regulator can identify that the asset price
volatility is due to market malfunctioning, then this macro-prudential policy could not
only alleviate the procyclical effect of a fire sale as they suggested, but it can also
decrease the likelihood of systemic risk ex ante, since banks may find it profitable to
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purchase liquidated assets if the margin requirement is not marking to the market. The
time-varying capital requirement can then regulate the individual risk-shifting
problem ex ante without causing the problem for banks to generate high systemic risk
ex post.
7. Conclusion
This chapter argues that a “too many to fail” rescue only arises if a bank is unwilling
to purchase the liquidated assets. We show that this can happen if the margin
requirement of capital holding is marked to the market price, and the market price is
subject to the cash-in-the-market constraint. We then show that in the presence of a
“too many to fail” rescue, banks can have a higher incentive to invest in highly
correlated assets ex ante, in order to increase the probability of systemic risk, thus
trigger the regulator’s bailout policy. We then compare the social welfare losses in
which there is no capital requirement at all and in which there is a market sensitive
capital requirement. We argue that, given the incentive for regulatory arbitrage, the
social loss can be greater under the market price-sensitive capital requirement.
Perhaps the most supportive empirical evidence for our model is the U.S. Treasury
arranged a bailout of $700 billion funding for the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP), inter alia, in 2008. The U.S. government argued that TARP was necessary
because many banks held Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) which were in trouble
and became illiquid, which could have led to sector-wide banking difficulties in the
absent of intervention. Although it is optimal for the government to intervene ex post,
this chapter argues that it can distort banks’ incentive ex ante and generate a “too
correlated to fail” problem. The TARP is intended to purchase the troubled assets so
that it could stabilize the asset price hence release banks from the pressure of high
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margin calls on capital ratio. We argue that if capital regulation can be made
state-dependent - so that the authorities commit to relax the capital ratio in a bad state
of the world, then it could not only alleviate the problem of high margin on capital
ratio ex post, but also give banks the incentive ex ante to invest in less correlated
assets. This will lower the probability of systemic failure.
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Appendices
1. Lemma 1: It is optimal for the regulator to liquidate Bank B’s assets to Bank A, and
it is also profitable for Bank A to purchase the assets at the cash-in-the-market price
by accessing Bank B’s depositors and borrowing from outside investors.
Proof: We first show that the regulator is willing to liquidate the assets to the
surviving bank. The regulator has three options: 1) the regulator can bail out the failed
bank, which will cost 10 r to pay off the depositors; 2) the regulator can liquidate
the assets to outside investors. The cost of the deposit insurance is Ipr 0 . However,
there is a misallocation cost of  ; 3) if the regulator liquidates the assets to Bank A
at the cash-in-the-market price, there is no misallocation cost, and since the bank can
borrow from outside investors to purchase the assets, the cost of providing the deposit
insurance is again Ipr 0 .
Next we show that it is profitable for Bank A to purchase the liquidated assets.
Bank A’s expected profit after the purchase is:
  IISF pRprRrRuE  )1(2))1(()( 112  (A.1)
where the first term in the first equality is the expected payoff from the existing assets,
and the second term is the expected payoff from purchasing the assets by borrowing
from Bank B’s depositor and outside investors. It is profitable for Bank A to acquire
the asset if IpR  )1( . Note that the maximum willingness to pay for outside
investors is:
1)(  Rp  (A.2)
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where outside investors can borrow 1 unit of endowment from depositors. Given the
cash-in-the-market price Ipp  , we then find that the minimum profit for Bank A
from acquiring the asset is  .
2. Lemma 4: The profitability for Bank A to purchase the liquidated assets depends
on the cost of capital at the cash-in-the-market price:
1. If ))(()1( II pkpR   , Bank A is willing to purchase the assets at the
liquidated price, and it is optimal for the regulator to liquidate B’s assets to A.
2. If ))(()1( II pkpR   , Bank A is unwilling to purchase the assets at the
liquidated price. The regulator bails out the failed bank if  Ip , and the regulator
liquidates the assets to outside investors otherwise.
Proof: We first show the profitability condition for Bank A to acquire the liquidated
assets. Bank A’s expected profit after the purchase is:
   ))((1))((1)( 02 IISF pkpRpkRuE   (A.2)
where the first term is the expected payoff from the existing assets net of the cost of
capital and the second term is the expected payoff from purchasing the liquidated
assets net of the cost of capital at the cash-in-the-market price Ip . It is profitable for
Bank A to acquire the assets if and only if ))(()1( II pkpR   , otherwise Bank A
will make a loss.
We then show that the regulator is willing to liquidate the assets to the surviving
bank. The regulator faces three options: 1) the regulator can bail out the failed bank,
which will cost ))(1( pk to pay off the depositor; 2) the regulator can liquidate the
assets to an outside investor. The cost of the deposit insurance is Ippk  ))(1( .
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However, there is a misallocation cost of  ; 3) if the regulator liquidates the assets
to Bank A at the cash-in-the-market price, there is no misallocation cost, and since the
bank can borrow from outside investors to purchase the assets, the cost of providing
the deposit insurance is again ppk  ))(1( . However, if ))(()1( II pkpR   ,
the regulator can only choose either to liquidate the assets to an outside investor,
which induces a cost of misallocation  , or to bail out Bank A, which gives up Ip
of its funds to make up the cost of the deposit insurance cover. We then have that if
 Ip the regulator will liquidate the funds to an outside investor, and it will bail
out Bank A otherwise.
3. Full analysis of the bank’s strategy and the regulator’s bailout under market
price-sensitive CAR
3.1 Consider the case in which ))(()1( II pkpR   and ))(()1( SS pkpR   ;
the banks’ expected payoff in state FS is:
 








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I
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pifpkR
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uE
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(A.3)
and the banks’ payoff in state FF is:
 








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S
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pifpkR
pif
uE
))((1)1(
0
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(A.4)
We have shown the case in which  Ip and  Sp in section 5. We consider two
other cases in which  Ip and  Sp , and  Ip and  Sp . Note that since
we have SI pp  , we can rule out the possibility that  Ip and  Sp .
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3.1.1  Ip and  Sp
The regulator has full commitment to not bailing out banks in any state. A bank’s
expected payoff in state SF is thus the same as in state SS:
)()( 22
SSSF uEuE 
The bank’s expected payoff in states FS and FF is zero since the regulator finds it
optimal to liquidate the assets to outside investors:
0)( 2 
FSuE
0)( 2 
FFuE
The second-period expected payoff when the banks invest in different industries is:
)()1()())0(( 22
2
2
SSSS uEuEuE  
The second-period expected payoff when the banks invest in the same industries is:
)())1(( 22
SSuEuE 
We then have:
0))1(())0(( 22  uEuE
The banks are indifferent between choosing correlation level one and choosing
correlation level zero.
3.1.2  Ip and  Sp
The regulator suffers from both a “too big to fail” and a “too many to fail” rescue.
Given equation A.3 and equation 15, we then have the bank’s expected payoff in state
FF:
)()1()( 22
SSFF uEuE 
Equations A.4 and 15 give the bank’s expected payoff in state FS:
)()1()( 22
SSFS uEuE 
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The bank’s expected payoff in state SF is the same as in SS:
)()( 22
SSSF uEuE 
The second-period expected payoff when banks invest in different industries is then:
)()1()1()()1)(1()()1()())0(( 2
2
222
2
2
SSSSSSSS uEuEuEuEuE  
The second-period expected payoff when banks invest in the same industries is:
)()1)(1()())1(( 222
SSSS uEuEuE  
We then have:
0))1(())0(( 22  uEuE
Given  Ip and  Sp , the banks are indifferent between choosing the
correlation level of one and choosing the correlation level of zero.
3.2 Consider the case in which ))(()1( II pkpR   and ))(()1( SS pkpR   ;
the banks’ payoff in state FS is:
0)( 2 
FSuE
Because in this case the surviving bank finds it profitable to purchase the liquidated
assets at the cash-in-the-market price, it is also optimal for the regulator to liquidate
the assets to the surviving bank as in lemma 4.
The bank’s expected payoff in state FF depends on the cash-in-the-market price of the
assets and the misallocation cost; we then have equation 22:
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3.2.1  Sp
The bank’s expected payoff in state SF is given by equation A.2; combining equation
A.2 and 15, we then have:
 ))((1)()( 22 IISSSF pkpRuEuE  
The bank’s payoff in state FF is zero if  Sp , as in equation 22.
0)( 2 
FFuE
The second-period expected payoff when the banks invest in different industries is
then:
))]((1)()[1()())0(( 22
2
2
IISSSS pkpRuEuEuE  
and the second-period expected payoff when the banks invest in the same industries
is:
)())1(( 22
SSuEuE 
We then have:
))]((1)[1())1(())0(( 22
II pkpRuEuE  
In this case, the bank’s dominant strategy is to choose the correlation level of 1.
3.2.2  Sp
In this case the bank’s expected payoffs in states SS, SF and FS are the same as in
section 3.2.1. The only difference is that in state FF the bank has a positive expected
payoff; given equations 22 and 15 we have:
)()1()( 22
SSFF uEuE 
The second-period expected payoff when the banks invest in different industries is
then:
)()1()1())]((1)()[1()())0(( 2
2
22
2
2
SSIISSSS uEpkpRuEuEuE  
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and the second-period expected payoff when the banks invest in the same industries
is:
)()1)(1()())1(( 222
SSSS uEuEuE  
We then have:
))]}(())(()[1())]((1[){1())1(())0(( 022 pkpkppkpRuEuE
IIII  
The first term in the equation is positive; the second term is also positive since the
capital requirement at Ip is greater than that at 0p . The bank’s decision regarding
the correlation level depends on  and ))(( Ipk . Holding  constant, the greater
the cost of capital at Ip , the less incentive the bank has to choose correlation zero.
3.3 Consider the case in which ))(()1( II pkpR   and ))(()1( SS pkpR   .
In this case we are back to the benchmark model.
The bank’s expected payoff in FF is given by equation 22:
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3.3.1  2Sp
The bank’s expected payoff in state FS is zero, because both the surviving bank and
the regulator find it optimal to liquidate the assets to the surviving bank.
0)( 2 
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The bank’s expected payoff in state SF is again given by equations A.2 and 15.
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Equation 21 shows that the bank’s expected payoff in state FF is zero, since the
regulator finds it optimal to liquidate the assets to outside investors.
0)( 2 
FFuE
The second-period expected payoff when the banks invest in different industries is
then:
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and the second-period expected payoff when the banks invest in the same industries
is:
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We then have
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Since the regulator finds it optimal to liquidate the assets to outside investors in state
FF and banks find it profitable to purchase the liquidated assets in state SF, it is
optimal for the bank to choose the low correlation level.
3.3.2  2Sp
In this case, the bank’s expected payoffs in states SS, SF and FS are the same as in
3.3.1. The bank’s expected payoff in state FF is given by equation 21. We have:
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The second-period expected payoff when the banks invest in different industries is
then:
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and the second-period expected payoff when the banks invest in the same industries
is:
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We then have:
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The first term in the equation is positive, and the sign of the second term depends on
the cost of capital in systemic failure; if ))(( Spk is large enough, banks have a
low incentive to choose a high correlation, and also if )(( Ipk low. In general, for a
given  , the sign of the equation really depends on the expected profit that the
surviving bank can obtain in SF relative to the expected payoff in state FF, which
faces a high cost of capital.
